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~he United States and ~aval Lirnitaion: 
.!i'rom the Washinyton Co'i1t'eremce to Pearl rlarbor 
DaVId Jonas Murphy 
~enior Honors Thesis 
2'j April 1~d3 
IntroductIon 
"Foreign polIcies are not built upon 
abstractions. ~hey are the resu~t of 
practical conceptions of national interest 
arising from some i~"ediate exigency or 
standIng out vIvidly in historical 
perspective ••. When we (Dnited States) have a 
c~ear sense of our own interests, we are just 
as inflexible as others." 
---Char~es ~vans Hughes 
In conducting their foreign affairs, nations rarely act for 
pure~y altruistic reasons. Often, when their stated objectIves 
are noble ones- such as world peace- one can find others which 
stem from tne perceived needs of the individual nation or 
nations. The United dtates has not been an exception to this 
rule. between Wor~d War I and World War 11 the foreIgn po~icy ot 
the United States had as one of its major goals world peace or, 
fai~ln9 worLd peace, peace for the United States. ~atura~ly, 
this was not a totally altruistic ideaL. It was believed that 
the UnIted ~tates wouLd prosper more in a wor~d at peace than in 
a world at war. In addition, the peop~e of the United States did 
not wisn to become involved in another world war. 
The United ~tates supported many different policies to 
attempt to attain this objectIve of peace. AI~ of them were 
limited, to some degree, oy national self-interest. fi major 
limit was the dictum that the UnIted States Should not enter into 
any treaties with any major power wnich could force the United 
~tdtes into a situation where it wou~d be required to commit its 
armed forces, or impose sanctions, at the command of other 
governments. ~huS, the United States wished to preserve its 
freedom of action in internationa~ affairs. It might consuLt 
~ 
wIth other governruents, out it would decide what to do by Itself. 
The policies which the United States supported during this time 
ranged from Wilson's League of ~ations- whicn did not meet the 
crIteria for independence of United States action- to the 
~eutrality acts of the late 1930's. One of the most successfUl 
and long lived of these policies was that of naval disarmament. 
It was also representative of United btates interwar foreIgn 
policy because it spanned tne perIod. 
The era of naval disarmament lasted from the Washington 
Conference of 1~2l until ~epternoer .L~3~, when the armies of 
Germany invaded Poland and start~d World War II. ~he lingeriny 
effects of the naval disarmament treaties were observable even at 
Pearl Harbor. liistor ieal judgement of the Washington 'l'reaty 
system, as it was known, nas changed over time. When it began, 
and through the mid-late 1930's, it was viewed as one of the best 
internatIonal agreements ever written. it was genera~ly 
regarded as successful in helping to preserve world peace. 
~aturally, there was a minority view which held that the treatles 
were not effective and, depending ,on the nationality of the 
writer, weakened one power wnile strengthening others. This view 
was usually held by naval officers of the affected nations, and 
almost invariably they held that theIr own nation was the one 
which nad been weakened. 
It has been over sixty years since the United States issued 
the invitations to the Washington Conference of 1921. With that 
time comes a more objective perspective on 
Washington Treaty system was not perfect. It 
the subject. The 
was never intended 
to be perfect, for to be perfect all of the participants woula 
2 
nave been forced to glVe up a large amount of their sovereignity. 
However, it did attain its limited goals of reducing the post-
World War I arms race and helped to preserve the peace. Compared 
to other, contemporary, attempts to protect the post-war status-
quo it was relatively successfUL. What kllled the Washington 
Treaty system was the same thing whicn created it- national self-
interest. Just as the various nations had found the treaties to 
offer them benefits in l:iJ21 they found them to be handicaps in 
tIle later years. 'l'hi~ held as true for natlons which \vere 
attacked during ~'Jor ld War 1I as for tnose Wi1ictl oid the 
attacklng. 'linus, the era of naval disarmament was not one of 
idealism but of realism. ~ach nation acted according to its own 
perceived self-interests. 
(N. B. The terms 'disarmament', 'reduction of armament', etc. are 
used synonymously, as was the custom between the World Wars.) 
3 
CHAP'ft:R I 
An Uneasy Peace: 19lH-lY2l 
The defeat of the Central powers - Germany and Austria 
ended the first world war and signaled the fact that the old 
status-quo was dead and that a new one was emerging. It was 
obvious that the new division of power would be among the vic-
tors, Great Britain, the United States, France, Italy, and Japan. 
The balance of power was no longer gurocentric; it had 
become global. The presence of the United States and Japan in 
the victors' ranks proved that the war had changed the world. 
The United States entered World War I a debtor nation. Its prin-
cipal creditor had been Great Britain." After the war, Great 
Britain owed the United States money, as did the rest of Europe. 
In Asia, the Japan had created an empire since it had been re-
opened to the West. The Japanese controlled most of the Central 
Pacific and owned sizable economic interests on the continent. 
while the balance of power was a new, global, one, none of the 
holders of power ~new whether the distribution of power and 
composition of this group would change. 
By 1921 it did not seem as if the status-quo would last 
long. Relations among the victors had deteriorated since the 
war. This deterioration was especially evident among the United 
States, Great oritain, and Japan - the three great naval powers. 
There were four major reasons why relations among these nations 
had declined. The first cause for decline was the change in 
relative naval strength of these nations due to a naval arms 
race. The second set of these problems were the long standing 
1 
differences between the United States and Japan. The third was 
the Anglo-Japanese alliance and its effect on relations between 
the United States and Great Britain and Japan. 1" inally, the end 
of the war had brought economic rivalry among the three nations 
in Asia. Navalists and jingoists in the three nations used htes 
frictions as justification for big building programs. 
The first conflict among the three large naval nations was 
the naval race, which was partially an outgrowth of the German 
defeat. For the naval planners of the three great naval powers 
the most obvious strategic result of the world war was the de-
creased importance of the Atlantic, and the increased importance 
of the Pacific. All three nations had important strategic inte-
rests in or abutting the Pacific, and these interests were within 
range of each others' fleets. For example, the United States 
could strike at the Japanese home islands from Guam; the Japanese 
could attack the Philipppines from Formosa; and the British could 
attack F'ormosa from Hong Kong. 'rnerefore, most naval exper ts 
thought that the Pacific would be the battleground if a war ever 
broke-out among these nations. Also, many of these observers 
thought that there were good reasons for a possible war in the 
1 
near future. 
After the war, the United States government took cognizance 
of the new strategic naval situation, and re-arrnged its navy to 
reflect it. In 1919 the Unlted States divided its fleet into two 
2 
parts, the Battle Force and the Scouting Force. The Battle Force 
was composed of the heavier elements of the fleet - capital ships 
SUCh as the battleship and battlecruiser - and was considered the 
fighting strength of the fleet. The Scouting Force was the 
2 
lighter, yet faster, part of the fleet and mainly consisted of 
light cruisers and a new variant on the cruiser - the aircraft 
carrier. One would expect the Battle Force to be stationed within 
range of a discerned threat and, as it happenned the Battle Force 
was stationed on the Pacific coast of the United States and the 
Scouting Force was stationed in the more peaceful Atlantic. Thus 
the navy placed its important units facing what it considered the 
next possible theater of war. 
In addition to redeploying its existing naval forces the 
United States engaged in a program to augument them. The program 
for expanding the navy was not a new one, but the resumption of 
an old one. In 1916, Congress authorized a massive naval 
construction program of all types of ships from ten battleships 
3 
to two gunboats. This program was seen as insurance against a 
possible German victory. However, when the United States entered 
World War I the program was partially suspended, and all 
available resources were devoted to the construction of craft 
4 
such as destroyers with which to combat German submarines. 
After the war the United States no longer needed the program as 
insurance against German victory, and the United States navy was 
now the second largest in the world, after Great Britain. 
Nonetheless, the navy began construction on the sixteen capital 
ships authorized by the 1916 program - new ships delayed by 
wartime conditions. In addition to the ships on the ways, the 
navy asked for authorization for an even larger force in the 
5 
years after the war. 'llhe goal of this expanded program was to 
6 
"make the Navy of the United States the strongest in the world. II 
3 
This would be necessary to protect United States interests if the 
United States rejected membership in the League of Nations. And, 
if the United States did join the League the Wilson 
administration assumed that the navy would need to be expanded so 
7 
as to assume its role in helping to police the world. As a 
result of all of these building programs the United States had 
the potential to become, by the mid-1920s, the most powerful navy 
in the world. 
Naturally, the other ma~or naval powers saw this as a threat 
to their own interests, and they responded accordingly. Since 
the end of the war Britain had not begun any capital ship program 
of her own. Yet, in 1921, in response to the American program, it 
began to lay down four battle cruisers which were to be the 
largest warships in the world. Japan was in a similar situation. 
Until the Americans resumed thelr program Japan did not have a 
large number of ships planned, but after the Americans resumed 
building the Japanese responded in kind. ~he naval race had 
8 
begun. 
The second group of causes for friction among the tnree 
great naval powers were long standing differences between the 
United States and Japan. There were tour major areas of conflict 
between the United States and Japan. The first was the treatment 
of Japanese in the United States. This was a sore point which 
had caused trouble in the past. The people of the United ~tates, 
especially those in the Western states, had traditionally looked 
upon the Japanese immigrants as an inferior race and the Japanese 
government and people felt that that judgement was extended to 
them. Naturally, the Japanese government protested West Coast 
4 
racial incidents to the United ::;tates government. One example was 
the treatment of Japanese children in San Francisco in 1~05 and 
the Japanese government's reaction to it. In this case the San 
Francisco Board of Education ordered Japanese children segregated 
from white cnildren on the grounds that the Japanese were a bad 
influence on the whites. The Japanese government protested tnis 
as a violation of its 'most favored nation' status and as a 
result the Unlted States ordered a federal investigation of the 
incident. But, since the federal government did not have the 
9 
power to change the situation, the schools remained segregated. 
The second type of problem between the United States and 
Japan was conflict between the two nations in East Asia. While 
Japan received United States moral support during the war with 
Russia in 1904-1905, later the relationship had soured. The 
reason for this was that the American public had thought that 
.Japan was fighting the war for altruistic reasons - the 
protection of Manchuria against the 'colonial' Russians -and with 
the 'discovery' of the Japanese territorial demands on the 
Russians the United States began to think of the Japanese as 
10 
another imperialist nation. When the Japanese took the German 
possesions in China and Pacific islands during World War I this 
dissillusionment increased. 
Concurrent with the conflict in foreign policies in East 
Asia was the conflict in economic policies. The United States had 
advocated the Open Door policy in Asia where-as the Japanese 
favored their own version of the Monroe Doctrine in which the 
Japanese would receive preferential treatment in East Asia. This 
5 
is illustrated by the infamous Twenty-One Demands which 
restricted China's sovereignity and the adverse reaction of the 
Japanese to a 
11 
banking consortium to finance China's 
development. 
The final major category of conflict between the United States 
and Japan had to do with the territories which Japan had occupied 
during the war. These lands included the quondam German 
concessions in Shantung, German islands in the Pacific 
including the important cable center on Yap, and parts of Russia. 
All of the former German posessions had been promised to Japan by 
tne Brltish and the French prior to American entrance in the war, 
but parts of this transfer were not agreed of by the United 
12 
States. 'l'he occupation of Russian territory, ostensibly to 
preserve order and prevent the spread of Communism to Korea and 
13 
Northern Japan, was also protested by the United States. Tnere 
were other incidents between the two nations which helped strain 
relations. One such was the shooting of an American naval 
14 
officer by Japanese sentries in Vladivostok. 
The Anglo-Japanese Alliance was the third obstacle to a 
lessening of tensions among Great Britain, the United States and 
Japan. The alliance had been created in 1902 as one of many 
which the European powers entered prior to World War I. This 
alliance was intended as a hedge by the British against the 
Russians, and later the Germans. As the British saw it it would 
keep its enemies from attacking its territories east of India and 
it would allay the fears of those territories of a Japanese 
attack. After the war this alliance was not as essential to the 
15 
British as it had been. However, the British Pacific Domi-
6 
nions were ambivilent, they were not in favor of its abandonment 
as they still feared a possible Japanese attack yet they did not 
want the Alliance to involve them in a war with the United 
States. Another dominion - Canada - was totally against the 
Alliance. The reason for Canadian dislike of the Alliance was 
their worry that it could force them to become involved in a war 
16 
with their neighbor to the south, the United States. Also, the 
alliance was a political albatross outside of the British Empire. 
The United States was up~et by the possibility that it might have 
to fight the British Empire if it went to war against the Japa-
17 
nese Bmpire. 
Finally, the fourth conf~ict among the United States, Great 
Britain and Japan. The world's economy was suffering from a 
sharp post-war aepression. 'l'his complicated Japanese relations 
with the ~uropean powers and with the United States. The problem 
was that during the war Japn's industry had expanded to handle 
the demands of the Asian markets but when the war ended the other 
nations, with their war expanded economies, returned to Asia and 
18 
came into sharp competition with Japan. 
With all of these areas of contention the United States, 
Japan, and Great Britain needed a forum to meet where they could 
try to solve their various, interrelated, problems. The logical 
place would have been the League of Nations in Geneva~ but the 
United States had rejected its charter membership and another 
means needed to be found. The alternative was to let the situa-
tions deteriorate to the point where one of the frictions could 
be the 'match' which would ignite a war among the three powers. 
7 
Ct!l\P 'J.'.c; R I I 
Preliminaries to a Conference 
When the United States Congress passed the naval appropria-
tions act of 1916 it authorized the largest increase of the navy 
in history. Surprisingly, in the same act it authorlzed the 
President to call a conference of the great naval powers to 
negotiate a reduction in naval armament. If the conference 
achieved this goal, then the president could reduce or eliminate 
1 
the planned expansion of the navy. The rationale behind this 
was that if the other powers significantly reduced their navies 
then the United States would not neea to expand its navy, as 
2 
naval power is relative. This call for a naval conference was 
not a new one. No less a figure than the Secretary of the Navy, 
Josephus Daniels, had annually recommended one Slnce he took 
3 
office in 1913. However, the United States had no intention of 
disarming unilaterally. instead it continued to build up its navy 
while calling for a conference. As Secretary Daniels said, "l'-JO 
single nation, with large interests, can safely take a vacation 
in the building of battleships. That much to be desired vacation 
4 
must come through concerted action.' 
In 1920, while the rest of the nation was in a three year 
post-war recession, the navy continued to ask for unprecedented 
amounts of money for a new building program. In - addition to the 
costs of building an expanded fleet there were also the costs 
associated with manning and maintaininglt. Public opinion in 
the United States, as expressed by the press and interest groups, 
was in favor of naval disarmament or reduction. Such papers as 
1 
the L'Jew York 'I'imes and the Wall titreeet Journal lent the1r 
support to aborting the new building program. ~ven the pro-navy 
magazine the Scientific ~merican was in favor of reduction. 
urganizations favoring naval disarmamewnt ranged from the 
traditional peace societies to the American Fede~ation of Labor. 
One of the main reasons for disarmament's popularity was its 
concommittant reduction in expenditures. Other reasons included 
th~ moral benefit which a reduction in arms would produce. ~here 
5 
was significant public support for arms reduction. 
The post-war history of the Congress and the Executive 
working to convene a naval disarmament conference is interesting. 
Congressmen took their cues from the 'public' and strongly 
favored naval disarmament. During the second Wilson 
Administration, before the League fight, ' many Congressmen thought 
that the League of Nations would accomplish this. While Wilson 
was in Paris, the House Naval Affairs Committee, at his urging, 
reported favorably on a bill which continued the war time 
expenditures of the Navy. ~lthough the majority of Congressmen 
did not want an increase of the ~avy they agreed to this 
subterfuge so Wilson could use it as leverage in negotiations 
with the British at Versailles. The administration told Congress 
that as soon as Wilson had negotiated an acceptable League of 
Nations, which would provide the security needed to allow for a 
reduction in arms, then the United States would limit its arms. 
Wilson told the British that if they did not support hi s League 
of Nations he would build the United States Navy to such a level 
that the British would lose their command of the seas. Bowing to 
pressure, the British accepted Wilson's demands and then Wilson 
2 
promised them that he would postpone any further construction and 
withdraw administration support for the Big Navy bill before 
6 
Congress. 
Wilson returned to the United States and presented his 
League to the Senate for approval. During the war, ~enators such 
as Henry Cabot Lodge favored a League of Nations. When Wilson 
gave the Senate ta copy of the treaty, these attitudes change9. 
Lodge, and other Senators believed that the United ~tates should 
not sign the Covenent of the League as it was. The primary 
objection toward the League was specifically toward Article X of 
the treaty. This article committed the United States to support 
any sanctions voted by the League against any nation which 
violated the Covenent and international law. Most of the Senate 
wished to amend this article so that the United States could 
decide whether or not it would participate in League actions. 
The major fear was that the League could force the United ~tates 
to police ~urope and perhaps become involved in another war. The 
question was whether the United States would restrict its freedom 
of action - sovereignity - or place reservations on its League 
mambership. Wilson commanded the Democrats and ordered them not 
to accept any treaty with reservations. AS a result of Wi~son's 
stubborness the League did not gain the two-thirds majority it 
needed to pass the Senate. The United States had rejected the 
League of Nations. hlso the United States had rejected an 
organization which might have provided the security needed to 
reduce arms. With the defeat of the League, the Wilson 
7 
Administration once again supported a naval build-up. A new 
3 
process had to be found which would produce a reduction in arms. 
~his might come with the next administration, for Wilson was too 
sick to run again for office. 
It appeared to the public that any new administration would 
support limiting arms. During the presidential campaign both 
candidates stated that they supported a reduction in armaments. 
President Harding, in his inaugural address stated that he was in 
d 
favor of arms reduction and wou~d work to that end. But with 
the evidence of the first month of the Harding administration it 
appeared that without a goad to push the Harding, all the talk 
about limitation would remain just talk. 
While President Harding had said in his inaugural address 
that he was in favor of disarmament he quickly changed his 
position. By the middle of April, 1921 'Harding had made it clear 
that his method of 'disarming' was to increase the United States 
Navy so that its strength was greater than any other navy. In 
other words he had taken the advice of the professionals in the 
navy and was advocating the continuation of the building program 
of 1916 with the additions recommended in 1920. Only after this 
expansion would Harding be willing to negotiate, from a superior 
13 
position. 
Senator William E. Borah, of Idaho, was one of the strongest 
Congresslonal supporters of a disarmament conference. It was 
Borah who pushed the admlnistration to actively consider a method 
to reduce arms. In December 1920, he sponsored a resolutlon 
which was attached to the naval appropriations bill before 
Congress. This resolution authorized the President to call a 
9 
conference of the world powers to discuss naval arms control. 
4 
'l'he main asumption behind the resolution was that reaucing the 
level of arms of the three great naval nations - the United 
States, Great Britain and Japan -would reduce the likelihood of 
war between them. Another underlying assumption of was that the 
United States, Great Britain And Japan had a common interest 
the reducton of arms - and were willing to negotiate to that 
end. Borah believed in these assumptions and based his beliefs 
on the public statements of the British and Japanese governments, 
who had said that they were increasing their navies only because 
the United States was increasing its own. 
10 
Thus, he thougnt that 
a negotiated reduction was possible. ~he Borah resolution died 
along with its host act - the naval appropriations bill -when the 
66th Congress ended in March 1921. The reason the naval act had 
not been passed in the earlier session was that tne members of 
Congress could not agree on the amounts to be given the navy for 
construction of new snips. Most Congressmen wanted a severely 
reduced verSlon of the budget estimate submited to it by the 
Navy. The new Congress was left to settle the problems left from 
the last Congress. 
11 
'.I.'he naval appropr iation act was one of 
them. Borah re-introduced his rider resolution for a 
12 
disarmament conference. To a large extent its fate depended on 
whether or not the President supported it or not. 
Initially, Harding strongly opposed the Borah resolution as 
it ran counter to his method of building before negotiating. 
However, Harding changed his mind by the middle of May, as a 
result of pressure from peace groups, Congressmen and the press. 
He now told Congress that he had no objection to the substance of 
5 
the resolution, but he felt that the legislature would be pre-
empting executive powers. He also said that the State Department 
had been trying to arrange a conference and thus the resolution 
14 
was redundant. Here can be seen the effects of the League 
fight. In the League fight Congress gained some control over the 
conduct of foreign policy. Members of Congress such as Borah 
were unwilling to relinquinsh this control. Naturally Harding as 
the president wanted to keep as much power as possible. 'l'his 
strong Congressional control over foreign policy would continue 
throughout the inter-war period. 
With this softening of Executive opposition the Borah 
amendment passed the Senate in May 1921, and the House in late 
June, by a unanimous vote in the ' Senate and with only three nay 
15 
votes in the House. 'l'he only thing which could have stopped 
the Borah resolution would have been defeat of the naval approp-
riations act to which it was attached. 
According to the Secretary of State, Charles E. Hughes, 
"WhiLe it became apparent that a conference would have to be 
16 
called, events abroad precipiated United States action. " 
Overseas, the Imperial Conference of the British ~mpire was 
meeting in London from June through August of 1921. 'rhe purpose 
of this conference was to inform the Dominions of British poli-
cies for defense and foreign affairs. As recounted earlier, one 
of the points of controversy among the dritish Dominions was 
renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Also, the Empire worried 
17 
about the new naval race. 'l'he Imper ial Conference dec ided that 
the British would ask the United States to caLL a conference on 
'Far Eastern Questions' and on naval disarmament, and a message 
IJ 
to that efffect was delivered to the American ~mbassy for 
transmittal to Washington. Owing to a delay at the American 
embassy in Londbn, the british request for a conference on the 
Far Bast was three days late in arriving in Washington. ~hus, 
when David Lloyd George, the British Prime Minister, was asked in 
Parliament whether the British would be sponsoring a conference, 
he replied that he had sent a message to the United States asking 
18 
if it would sponsor one. Unfortunately, Hughes first heard of 
this was when the press questioned him for confirmation. tiugnes 
thought that it was important for the United States to hold the 
initiative. So, he sent telegrams to the Briti~h, French, 
Italian, and Japanese governments inquiring if they were 
interested in a conference, hosted by the United States, on 
19 
limitation of armament. 
When Hughes finally received the English overture he was 
quick to amend his own proposal to reflect the British request 
20 
for a conference on Far ~astern matters. He accomodated the 
British position because he agreed that "the problem of limita-
tion of armament .•. does relate to Pacific and Far Eastern 
questions," but said that interest in disarmament is not limited 
21 
to that area of the world. For example Italy, even though it 
was not a Pacific power, was interested in the resolution of the 
arms race because it was a power in the Mediterranean along with 
France and Great Britain, which were also Pacific powers. Thus 
the Pacific balance of power affected that in the Mediteranean, 
and vice-versa. For a similar reason - the dependence of the 
balance of power on all types of arms - Hughes in his notes to 
7 
the othere nations suggested that the conference discuss all 
22 
types of arms, not just navl ones. Also, Hughes thought that 
China should be included in the conference on Far ~astern matters 
since the situaton in China, which was still in the midst of its 
23 
long revolution, would probably be discussed. 
The Italian, French and Chinese gove~nments replied that 
they would welcome a conference, but Britain and Japan both had 
24 
some procedural reservations. The British government wanted a 
preliminary conference on the Far Hastern matters. The British 
government favored a preliminary conference among the United 
States, Japan and itself, to be held in London, to settle the Far 
~astern problems, especially the situation with regard to the 
25 
Anglo-Japanese Allinace. This would be convenient to the 
British and would also have the potential of making the 
Washington Conference a minor one. Hughes would not accept the 
loea of a preliminary conference because it would be held before 
the Japanese delegation could arrive in London and would not be 
fair to that nation. Hughes also feared that if a London 
preliminary conference failed to solve the problems of the 
Pacific basin, the conference in Washington to discuss limitation 
of armaments might be cancelled. Hughes believed that both 
subjects should be pursued simultaneously. Furthermore, Hughes 
disliked the idea of a preliminary conference in London because 
it was one of the two capltaIs of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 
and he wanted to avoid the appearence of the United ~tates 
26 
colluding with the other two powers. A final reason for his 
rejection of the preliminary conference was that it would take 
the initiative from the United States, something which Hughes did 
27 
not want to lose. Therefore, the British abandoned their idea 
of a preliminary conference and accepted Washington as the site 
of the conference. 
The Japanese objections covered the discussion of Far 
Bastern and Pacific problems. They wanted to know the nature and 
scope of the discussion. They did not want the agenda of the 
Washington Conference ' discussions on the Pacific to be wide open 
28 
and wanted to limit it to avoid sensitive subjects. One such 
topic was that of imigration of Japanese, which was very 
unpopular in the Western United States and in the British 
Dominions of Australia and New Zealand. It also embarrassed 
Japanese pride to have the subject brought up, since racist 
attitudes denegrating to the Japanese might be aired. This was 
one of the first issues to be placed 'out of bounds' by the three 
29 · 
great powers. The British, the Japanese and the United States 
agreed to draw up the agenda for the Washington Conference 
through informal discussions but, bowing to United States' 
pressure against anything which resembled a preliminary 
conference, not to confer on solutions before the conference. 
un July 12, 1921 Congress finally passed the naval approp-
riations act with the Borah rider, which had been passed in June. 
Hughes now felt that he had the authority to issue the formal 
30 
invitations at his convenience. Be had received the replies to 
his informal lnvitation and the United States had negotiated a 
solution to the questions of Japan and Britain regarding the 
agenda and a preliminary conference. Nations other than the 
great powers - Spain, Belgium, the Netherlands and Portugal 
9 
asked for invitations. ~hey were told in JUly that only the five 
powers - Japan, the British Empire, the United States, France, 
and Italy -were invited (although Hughes had sounded out China on 
31 
attending the conference.) After conferring with the other 
powers on a suitable date Hughes chose November 11th, ~~2l the 
third anniversary of the armistice ending World War I, in 
response to the sentimental wishes of Harding. In early AUgust 
1921, Hughes sent out formal invitations to a "Conference on the 
subject of Limitation of Armament, 1n connection with which 
·Pacific and Far Eastern questions will also be discussed, to be 
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held in Washington .•• " ~he invitation to the Chinese was one 
to attend the conference and paricipate 1n the discussions on 
Pacific and Far Eastern questions, but not disarmament. In 
addition, the list of invited nations was expanded by three. 
Belgium, the Netherlands, and Portugal - all of which had asked 
for invitations in July - were invited to attend the conference 
and partici~ate when it dealt with non-armament questions. ~he 
Netherlands and Portugal were invited since their Pacific 
possessions gave them an legitimate interest in the region. 
33 
Belgium was invited to soothe its national pride. 
As the tiritish, Japanese and American governments had 
arranged earlier, the exact details of the agenda were to be 
worked out by the great powers before the conference so that they 
could instruct their delegations as to the correct course to 
follow. Now that invitations had been accepted by the nine 
nations, and the agenda was taking form, the United States, and 




Planning for the Washington Conference 
Tne United States called the Washington Conference of 1921 
to discuss two main topics, ~aval Disarmament and 'Par ~astern 
Questions'. ~he United States invited nine nations to the 
Conference. ~hey were Great Britain, Japan, Prance, Italy, the 
i'<l etherlands, Portugal, China, and Belgium. All had finally 
accepted. Collectively they began to layout the Conference 
agenda, and individually to choose delegations, and draw up plan~ 
for the Conference. 
Tne Washington conference was supposed. to finish what 
Versailles had begun. Since the United States refused to enter 
the League of ~ations the assurances of security which the League 
promised were not as strong as they had been. 'l'he League was 
supposed to da@pen competition among the victors of the World War 
bj providing a forum at which to talk and possible sanctions to 
punish natIons who v iolated international laws. In this way the 
League would p~otect world peace. 
Instead of peace the three major naval powers (United 
~tates,Ja?anT and Great Britain) were competing in a na~al race 
similar 1n scope to that of Germany and Britain before the War. 
Also, all o f. the powers except Belgium were concerned about the 
situation i n the ~acific which, with China divided into warring 
military govern~ents and foreign concessions and the United 
States and Ja?an arguing over the mandated islands, looked as if 
it could bode iJ..l for the immediate future. When ail of these 
wer e combine ~ with the depressed post-war world economy and the 
1 
genera l unease in Europe the status-quo did not look as if it 
would last for long. 
Even before the nations formally accepted the invitations 
the foreign ministries were working on the topics to be 
discussed. Almost every nation concerned considered the agenda 
to be very important. They all had a list of items they wanted 
placed on the agenda, or excluded from it. The most sensitive 
topics to the United States , Japan, Great Britain and China 
concerned the Pacific. 
Foreig n Minister Lord Curzon of Great Britain suggested that 
the nations Limit the agenda on the Pacific to such topics as the 
Open Door, bhantung and related questions, the territorial 
integrity of China, and leased territory in and around the 
Pacific. Questions wh ich he did not want discussed the status of 
Far Bastern RussIa, the opium trade, 
1 
imigration, and the former 
German islanas in the Pacific. 
uapan and the United States both had objections to parts of 
Curzon ' s propcsa~. Japanese objections encompassed all of the 
listed topics . ~he Japanese considered China and Shantung a 
settled question as they believed that Shantung had been dealt 
with at Paris in i919 , and China's status was above discussion. 
Also , they did no t want t o discuss leased territory as this would 
entail incLusion of their Manchurian properties. These lands were 
essential to tne Japanese economy as tney provided raw materials 
for Japan and se~ved as markets for their goods. The Japanese 
had reason t~ t ~ in~ that Western nations would join together to 
' steal' its propercies; other ~uropean nations had done that to 
J apan after tne ~ino-Japanese War of 1898 when they had taken the 
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Liaotung Peninsula from Japan after· the Japanese had won it as a 
spoil of war. One of the ~uropean nations, the Russians, had gone 
2 
on to build a naval base there - Port Arthur. 
The United States objected to the Curzon proposal because it 
was lnterested in the German islands. Also, Hughes believed that , 
the Hussian siuation should be discussed because of its 
similarity to China's problem. Far Eastern Russia was still 
fragmented after the revolution, and Hughes thought that there 
3 
was some danger of it being partitioned. 
After further conversations among Ministers 
Ama~assadors, Hughes sent a rough draft of an agenda to the 
conferees. It was dlvided into two sections . The first section 
dealt with limitation of armamemt. The second part had three 
subdivisions . F irst , questions relating to China, including: 
territorial and administrative integrity; Open Doorj concessions, 
~onopolies , and preferentiaL economic priviliges; railways and 
rates; ana s~a~s of existing commitments. Siberia was to be 
considered wit~ similar headings as China. Also, the Mindated 
islands questio~ Detween the United States and Japan, unless 
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set tled prior to the Conference, would be on the agenda. 
Most nations responded positively to this agenda. Japan, 
dritain, France ana China 'commented' on it, requesting changes. 
Japan wanted to know what was meant by "Status of Existing 
Commitments ". hgain the Japanese worried about a loss of Japanese 
poseSSlons . ~hen rlughes agreed not to discuss settled treaties , 
~he Japanese accepced the agenda . rlowever they reserved the 
5 
right to ralse ;ue~tions about the agenda at the Conference. 
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lhe 0ritish and the French wanted poison gas , airplanes and 
suomari nes listed as sub-topics under limitation ot armament. ~he 
6 
vni teo States agreed. China suggested the addition of 
7 
Chinese 
tariff autonomy and Hughes also agreed to this. 
Choosing the delegation for the United ~tates was as much an 
exercise in diplomacy as the agenda discussions. 'rhe conferees 
had decided that a reasonable number of d~legates would be four, 
With as many technical advisors as needed. The chairman of the 
American delegation was Hughes. This left three seats. Almost 
every ' important' person in the United States wanted a seat. 
They ranged from ~amuel Gompers, head of the American Federation 
of Laoor, to General of the Army John Pershing. Many of these 
'~ould be delegates ' were placed on an advisory committee which 
t:3 
was 'window d!"ess i ng ' to the real delegation. The 
Aoministration chose two Senators and former Secretary of State 
.l::.l.lbu K00t. ~ne two Senators were rlenry Cabot Lodge of 
9 
Nassachusetts o.!.,-" Uscar U:lderwood of Alabama. 'l'hey were, 
respectively, the ~enate maJority and minority leaders. In this 
way the Administration avoided the criticism which the Wilson 
rlciministration received when it omitted Senators from _. the 
delegation to Versailles in 1919. Also bi-partisan balance ~6uld 
increase the chances in the Senate for passage of any treaties 
the Conference - -prOO:1ced . In this way the administration hoped to 
avoid a repeat of the ~eague fight. Interestingly, ~enator Borah, 
who j.ntroduced t~e resolution to Congress which called the 
Conference, wa3 not a delegate. One of the reasons he was not 
chosen, and cne ~nich he recognized, was that he might not 
readily go a lan; wi th the Administration when it came time to 
4 
ratify the treati es . Borah admitted that he could turn on the 
treati es he had nelped create, and could cause troubl e for the 
10 
Administr a tion with inside knowledge. The Harding 
Administration picked Root because he was one of the elder 
moderates of the Republican party and his presence would be an 
asset when the Administration had to sell the results to the rest 
of the party. Also, as he had been a Secretary of State and a 
Senator h is knowledge would help during and after the Conference. 
'rhe other delegations reflected their nations' political 
processes. Japan chose a delegation chaired by Admiral Baron 
Kato. who wa s the l~avy L"linister, who by law"' had to be a 
professsional naval officer. Thi s reflected the awesome s trength 
which the military had in the Japanese government. If the" navy 
or the army did not agree with the civilians they could always 
force a chang e 1n government. Also, they were not under any 
civilian res~ralnt except for nominal financial control. The 
tact that t~'1e IL,?er ial Japanese Navy had accepted a conference 
was significant . It showed that the navy was as worried as the 
Finance Ministry over the increasing por tion of the budget which 
it was 5penaic9. Also, it betrayed the navy ' s fear s of the 
11 
r e sults of a war with the United States. 
Phe Fre~ch delegation was headed by Premier Aristide Briand 
who was the leading ~uropean delegate - he had been Premier of 
France seven ti~es already. Briand would prove to be a 
formidable opponent at the Washington Confe r ence as he defended 
1 2 
ni s nation ' s 1nter e sts. 
'rhe de1.2sa.tion repr e senting the tiritish Empir e \'las a large 
one. Great Britain had four delegates of its own and some of the 
iJominions were represented by one delegate each. '1' he nominal 
head of the British delegation was David Lloyd- George. Lloyd-
George and Curzon said that they could not come as the Irish 
troubles were too important; since the government might fall over 
the troubles they would not leave the British Isles. Therefore 
the real head of the British delegation was Lord Balfour. Other 
members were the First Lord of the Admirality, Lord Lee of 
Fareham, and the Ambassador to Washington ~ir Auckland Geddes. 
The Dominions sent five representatives, one each from Canada, 
13 
South africa, India, Australia, and ~ew Zealand. 
'The other delega tions were sma.iler and usually consisted of 
the Ambassador to the United States, the foreign mini ster and one 
14 
or two other rnem~ers. 
Just as the members of the various delegations reflected the 
domestic politics of their home.iands, the instructions to hese 
delegations reflected those nations' interests and policies in 
foreig n affairs. Most of these policies would remain constant 
throughout the iDter-wat period. Overall the United States was 
committed to a policy wh ich did not permit any military alliances 
- the United States wanted the privilage of deciding where its 
troops would ilght and for how long. It would deal with Europe 
but wanted nothi~9 to do with ~uropean affairs. '1'he same he Id 
true in Asia . It was willing to defend China diplomatically but 
not willing to fight for China ' s rights. The United States' 
proposa~s wo~~a reflect the desire not to be involved in an 
a lliance but i nstead offered specific solutions to specific 
problems. 
b 
AS the host nation the United ~tates was expected to offer 
its proposals first. clughe s had gained the initIative which he 
valued so highly. Now that he held the high ground the other 
nations were waiting to see what he dId with it. Hughe s had 
another advantage. The program of construction which the Navy 
had begun was an excellent bargaining chip. While the United 
States did not own any territory in the Far East except the 
~hilippines and Guam, the fleet-in-building gave the United 
States a say in both the discussions on the Pacific and naval 
limitation. 
Before the Conference, rlughes asked the ~avy for its advice 
and possible plans. The Navy, as represented by the General 
board, replied that the United States needed a navy at least as 
~arge as the British and twice that of Japan. Alternatively, 
official navy opinion held that if the United States did not 
manage to end the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, then the navy would 
need tq be equal that of the British and Japanese ~mpire's 
combined. However , the General Board wanted ahy limitations to 
go into e ff ect o~ly after the United States had finisheq its 
building progr2ill. claturally, if these recommmendations h~d been 
followed the UnIted States would have the largest navy, because 
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i t s program was further a long than any other nations'. 
The General Board ' s views usually represented the thoughts 
of American naval offIcers. The General Board was the policy 
making body t he navy. I ts pr es ident was the Chief of Naval 
Uperations a~~ lts memebership included most of the important 
officer s of the navy, such as the head of the War Colleg e and the 
7 
ne a d of the Office of Naval l ntelligence~ ~ne member s of the 
Ge ~era l Board were mostly Anglophiles who believed that the 
Uni ted States would do best to place its faith in "an undivided 
Anglo-Saxon race. " Statements such as these reflect the racism 
of many of the senior officers in the United States ~avy. ~he 
concept of an ~nglo-Saxon race assumed its superiority over the 
"8sia tics". Many of these same officers viewed a conflict with 
Japan as inevitable, and racism allowed them to envision an easy 
victory. The reasoning behind this conviction that a war would 
come wa s that the Urii ted States and Japan were trading rivals in 
Asia , and following Captain Alfred T . Mahan's precepts that such 
commercial rivalries usually lead to war, they felt that a war 
16 
wi t h Japan would surely follow. 
Hughes did not l ike the General Board's plan as it continued 
the United States' building progr~n, which had started the naval 
race, without 2~y sacrifices by the United States. He felt that 
it would not ~e accepted by the other nations. In the meantime 
two memebers of tne General Hoard and Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., 
the Assistant Secretary of . the Navy, had drawn up more suitable 
options. One called for some reduction of ships under 
construc t ion . rtno~ her sugg e sted scrapping oider ships so as to 
allow for cont i~uation of the newer ones. Both otions offered a 
better position to t he Japanese than the General Board ' s plan. 
Hughes l i ~ed these new options wh ich rtoosevelt had deve-
~oped, but agal~ was not satisfied. His final plan , endorsed by 
the 8merican co~i er ence delegation , was the famou s '~top Now' 
p~an which ca ll e d f o r the ending of all building programs and the 
sc rapping of ;::any O.icer capital ships a s well as those s till on 
8 
;:ne ways or planned for by the various navies. 'l'hi s plan would 
~eave the tnree great navies - rlritain, United States, and Japan 
- at a ratio of 5:5:3 respective~y, in tonnage of ships. Additio-
na~J..y, Hughes realized that 'Stop ~ow' would eliminate most 
aiscussion about the relative requirements of the various na-
t:ions, 
:i.eeas. 
and the resultant squabbling over ratios based on these 
He thought that if he could prevent such sqabbles, the 
17 
~onference had a good chance of acheiving a reduction in arms. 
'fhe Aillerican plans for the Pacific were as realistic as 
chose for navaL arms. Here the Navy's General Board advised that 
cne United States not even consider discussion of the military 
status of American Pacific territories. Tne Board wanted the 
Japanese mandated islands either neutralized or handed over to 
18 
~he United States, an unlikely and unrealistic solution. Other 
naval officers v iewed the situation from a slightly different 
ang Ie. CaptaIn DudLey Knox, a caustic critic of the Washington 
~onference, admlt~ed that the Japanese-held islandS were more a 
=hreat to the Unitea States than the Philippines and Guam were to 
Japan. But Knox aid not trust the Japanese and also thought , that 




so he be~leved that the United States would actua~ly 
Whil e Hughes listened to the naval officers he also listened 
=0 his political cOvlsors. both Senators Lodge and Underwood 
their opinion that Congress would not fortify United 
~~ates holdinss in toe We stern Pacific unless war was declarea. 
~S examples they used the hi story of past attmepts to appropriate 
9 
money to fortify the pnilippines and Guam as first class bases . 
20 
~one of these efforts had succeeded. AS a matter of fact it was 
cn~y in 1919 that the United States had begun building a base of 
the first rank at Pearl Harbor, but this base took years to 
develop. State department advisors including George Blakeslee, 
gave similar advice. Blakeslee told Hughes that the United States 
would benefit from an agreement neutralizing the Pacific islands. 
He cited as advantages the lessening of tensioris caused by a 
Imitation on bases in the area and the concommitent preservatIon 
Ll 
of the status-quo. Hughes adopted the views of the politicians 
and his State Department advisors, but did not incorporate them 
lnto hi s plan. He expected that the Japanese would raise the 
topic at the conierence , as tneir press and naval officers had 
already g i ven extensive coverage to the idea of neutra l izing the 
Pacific. 
On tne t~P I C of the mandated islands, Hughes decided that as 
the Un ited ~tates was already invo~ved in a d{plornatic 
negotlatiocs o~ ownership of the mandates he would wait for ~ 
suitable t~e at the conference to discuss the Islands . As for 
the other topics of the Conference Hughes decided that the 
Americans WOU Ld try to help preserve China's government and ask. 
the J apanaes co evacuate Shantung. On Siberia he planned a 
similar s~ra~egy . He delegated planning on these subjects to 
sUbordinates and waited for the Conference to hear the positions 
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of o ther na~ions. 
~ihi le the United States prepared its position other nations 
prepa red thel~s. Ene Japanese Navy had decided that it needed at 
~east a 10:10: 7 ra t io.(United States , Great britain, Japan) in 
10 
capital ship tonnage. AS mentioned earlier , the Japanese were 
interested in a possible neutralization of Pacific islands. The 
foreign and naval policies behind these two parts of the Japanese 
plan were not, as so often described after 1931, that of a 
militaristic imperialist nation with grand long term plans for 
conquest of Asia. While it was always lookin out for its own 
interests, Japan was willing to work with other nations to try to 
solve common problems. Thus when it carne to the Washington 
Conference, Japan 
limitaion and some 
was determlned to 




was ready and willing to discuss naval 
of the problems of the £ar East. But Japan 
defend lts interests such as Shantung and 
if at all possible keep them from being 
any other nation it would have prefered an 
agenda which discused only the topics it wanted to discuss. 
In t hp l~20s, the foreign policy of Japan aimed at 
protecting its interests in Asia and maintaining good relatlons 
witn any ~aClon which had the power to interfere in its special 
interests there~ The foreign ministry knew that most of Japan's 
power came £rc~ the economic strength which it derived from its 
Asian posessions . Without those resources and markets the 
Japanese ~ou!d 6e just another poo~ Asian nation. The Japanese 
had only to ~ook at the recent history of China, the Celestial 
~mpire, to se2 the foreign policies of the Western nations in 
actlon. Only recently, Japan had freed itself of unequal 
treaties imposed on it by the West, treaties which granted 
westerners s'.1ct: priviliges as extraterritorialty. Also, the 
Japanese neV2~ forgot the European interference at the end of the 
11 
Sino-Japanese war as an example of Western morality in foreign 
affairs. ~hus, the Japanese habit of treating We s tern proposals 
with s uspicion was well justified. 
While Japan was a cautious nation its fear s were nothing 
compared to those of China. Ju s t as the Ottoman ~mpire had been 
the sick man of hurope the Chinese nation was tnat of Asia. 
China had been partitioned into spheres of influence and con-
cessions so ~any time s that the Chinese had come to distrust the 
West more than they did their own governments. At the time of 
the Washington Conference the Central Government of Peking, the 
currently recognized government of China, was still paying indem-
nities to the Western nations and Japan for the damages caused 
durlng the Boxer Rebellion, and the expenses incurred by the 
~estern expeditionary force sent to put down the Rebellion. 
China was cot in a position to refuse Western demands. 'All that 
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it could nope for was that the West took pity on its condition. 
China ' s goalS at the Conference were to try to regain as 
much territory as possible for the Central Government, and not 
give away any more. Two sore points to the Chinese were the 
Shantung Concessions and some of the Japanese Concesiions in 
Manchuri a and No=tnern China. The Japanese were not well thought 
of by the 2Dlnese government. The Chinese still remembered the 
shame of t he Twenty -One Demands which Japan forced on China-
during Wor16 ~ ar I and the earlier humiliations after the 8ino-
Japanese War o~ Id~d. The Twenty-Une Demands took some sovereign-
ity from Cnlna and , while China was allied with Great Britain and 
France, the g reat powe rs did not stop the Japanese. The Chinese 
intended to use the Americans to help them regain their lands 
1 ? 
troin the Japanese . In this policy they depended on traditional 
American sympathies for China which were started by the missiona-
ries and perpetuated by the ~tate Department through such devices 
as the Open Door. Also , American businesses with interests in 
China preferred dealing with a weak Chinese government, especial-
ly when their altern~tive was to deal with a strong foreign 
concession government. ~he American press often took China's 
side when describing the effects of European and 0apanese inter-
vention in China. AS a result the United States often sided with 
the Chinese. At the Conference the Chinese intended to use these 
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advantages in their attempt to regain their property. 
The British plan for the Conference was two-fold. First , 
the British intended to let the United States have theoretica l 
equali t y with them in naval strength, but if at all possible to 
retain actua l sJperiority. The British viewed this as necessary 
as they hac longer iines of communication to protect than the 
Un ited t.'tates and an Empire which was much more dependent on the 
sea lanes tta~ t~e United States. Secondly , the British hoped to 
negotiate a t=eaty on the Pac i fic and Far East which was at least 
as effecti~e 2S the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. In fact they 
seriously considered expanding the Alliance to a Tripartite one, . 
wi th the U~i t eG S tates as the third member. This was abandoned 
after the U~ited States expressed its unwillingness to join a 
forma l al l ina ce . ~onetheless the British had hopes that some 
arrangeme n t couid be worked out wh ich would ensure the security 
25 
of the ~mpire :n the East . 
Other na ~i ons were drawing up their plans. Prance had 
13 
de signed its naval program to include a large number of sub-
ma rines and wished to bave them protected at the conference. The 
~rench favored submarines for two reasons. They were cheaper to 
build than capital ships. Second they were very effective as 
commerce destroyers; a role which most French naval officers saw 
as essentiai . In any possible war in Europe the French saw the 
26 
prime purpose of their navy as a blockading force. In regard 
to land armaments the French would not discuss reductions unti~ 
it had received a guarantee of security from the other powers. 
~his proposal had as much a chance of success with the United 
States as the League of Nations had had. On tne Pacific the 
French were willing to wait and see what the three major powers 
in that region did. ~he I~alians, Dutch, Portugese,and Belgians 
all had the aim of trying to obtain as many favors froM the big 
27 
powers as possible . Italy wanted nava~ equality with France. 
The Du tch a~d Portugese wanted security for their Pacific 
possessions~ ~he Belgians wanted the prestige of being invited 
to the Con£ere~ce. 
All of the nations, large and small, had devised the i r 
negotiating p~ans but none of them knew of Hughes' 'Stop Now' 
pl.an. l"los t toe naval nations expected a variant on the plan 
supported by the United States Navy's Genera l Board, a plan which 
would contin~e current programs and would place a ceiling on 
building - DU ~ a ceiling it would take years to reach. Their 
reac t ions to Hughes I • Stop Now' proposal would aetermine whether 
the Conference s ucceeded and lessened the problems left over from 
Versailles , o r ~het ner the current diplomatic tensions would 
continue to gred . 
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CilAPT.t:R IV 
~he Washington Conference: November 1921 - February 1922 
The Washington Conference was the first major international 
conference held in the United States, and the host tried to make 
a good impression on the various delegations.did its best to show 
off to the world. Secretary Hughes, and other dignitaries, met 
the delegates at Union Station with mi l itary bands and patriotic, 
curious, crowds. But under the festive surface lay a serious 
current of tension. The date of the conference , November 11th 
1921, was the thIrd anniversary of the victory over Germany by 
the nations meeting in Washington. Nonetheless, in that short 
time, ' relations among the victors had declined to a crisis level. 
On November 11th, the conferees helped the United States to 
dedicate its Tomb of the Unknown Soldier. President Harding, in 
n is usual grandiose style, stated that he hoped the '1'omb would be 
1. 
a reminder, to ~he delegates, of the horrors of war. 
PredictIon s on the the conference's success were ' mixed. 
Some observers nad very little faith, while others viewed success 
as a foregone conclusion. Most tended to take a middle position 
of cautious optiili i s~. ;rhey thought the conference would b;;;- hard 
pressed to ac~e :ve its goals , but allowed that it might and hoped 
that it wo uld. 
Un Novem~e r 12th President Harding officially opened the 
conference, tneD turned it over to Secretary Hughes. The 
deleg a tes gui c ; ~ .1.Y made Hughes chairman and then sat back to 
li sten to his c?en ing address. None of them anticipated th~ 
speech f Ollowed . What the y expected were broad 
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generalities about the benefits of reducing arms and the moral 
imperative to do so. The first part of Hughes' speech met these 
expectations. He spoke of the past attempts to reduce arms, 
inc~uding the Hague Conferences before the War. These had been 
called by the Czar of Kussia to deal with the problem of 
increasing expenditures on weapons. After citing other 
preceaents at length, Hughes then said that the United States had 
a plan which it would put forth at the Conference. Again, the 
delegates expected this. It was then that Hughes surprised his 
audIence. He started to list the specifics of the American plan. 
The United States proposal had four underlying principles. 
First, all capita~ ship building programs should be abandoned. 
Further, some of the older ships of all the fleets should be 
scrapped. Third, the current level of naval strength should be 
respected. Erom the tnird principle, Hugnes derived the last 
one; capital ShIp tonna~e was to be used as the measure of 
streng th amo~g the navies of the world, and a proportionate 
nu~ber of auxi:lary crait should be aLlowed each nation. After 
listing tnese pr~ncipies, Hughes proceeded to give the details of 
the plan. 
NatIon by ~acion , rlughes listed the parts of their fleets 
which the American plan would cause to be broken up. The nations 
named were america, Great Britain, and Japan. The French and 
Italian navie s were too small to be discussed until the three 
greater powers a;reed on a treaty among themselves. The total 
number of ships to be dismantled was staggerring. The United 
States was tc ~ose th irty ships; The British Empire nineteen; 
Japan seventeen . not including eight planned but not laid down. 
In add i tion, Hughes proposed a ten year naval hOliday in capital 
ship construction. Combined all of the reductions would produce 
a tonnage ratio of 5:5:3 among the United States, Great Britain 
and Japan. The United States would have 500,000 tons as would 
Great Britain. Japan would have 300,000 tons. Finally, HUghes 
proposed a ten year holiday in the construction of capital ships. 
After giving all of these details to the conferees Hughes 
said that they were merely an outline of the full proposal. 
~ .. ext, Hughes summed up the benefits of his plan, saying that it 
'..;ould release money which might have otherwise been spent on 
navies and at the same time would provide adequate strength for 
~ational defense. Also, the ten year holiday would give the 
nations time to consider their courses in future bU~lding 
programs. 
offensive naval.. 'lIar 
and most important, "preparation for 
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will stop now." This statement was greeted 
with wild ap?lause from the the 'spectators, led by American 
't 
Representatives and Senators. 
The _delegates ! reactions were a mixture of shock and, later, 
admiration. The riritish delegation exhibited unusual displays of 
emotion. Accord~ng to one witness, when Hughes asked the British 
to scrap nineteen sn ips the First Sea Lord, Admiral Beatty, 
looked at ciugnes " in the manner of a bulldog, sleeping on a sunny 
doorstep, who nac been poked 1n the stomach by ..• an itinerant 
soap canvasse= ser!ously lacking in any sense of the most 
5" 
ordinary proprletles or considerations of personal safety." 
According to Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., Lord Lee , the First Lord of 
the Admiralty " turned the severa l colors of the rainbow, and 
3 
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behaved as if he were sitting on hot coals." ~he Japanese dele-
although forewarned by the fate of the British fleet, 
displayed their shock. One observer said they "stirr~d in their 
7 
seats and drooped close to the table." Hughes delivered hi s 
bombshell and sat back awaiting the reaction from the delegates 
ana, more importantly, from the press and the public, both in the 
United States and abroad. 
The domestic reaction to the speech was incredible. It 
appeared that the United States was behind Hughes almost one-
hundred percent. He captured the imagination of the press and the 
press in turn aroused its readers. A poll of Congress found 
almost una~imous support for the proposal. A Literary Digest 
poll of the Governors found the same support. Nost of the 
nation's dailies offered their endorsments. The WalL Street 
Journa~ said that "Mr. Hughes' proposal merits unqualified 
approvai. " The next day, Sunday, ministers across the nation 
seized on ~he Washington Conference as a topic for their sermons, 
and they also tenced to favor Hughes' plan. The reaction in the 
United States was . d . . 1· 'f' aKIn to that cause oy a nationa vIctory. 
Abroaj the reaction was not as extreme in its emotional 
displays ana was more critical than that in America. .Nonethe-
less, most o f the foreign press was optimistic. Severeal British 
newspapers , wnl~e noting that there were many difficulties to 
overcome , said that now the Conference had a good chance of 
succeeding. In Japan the response was even more favorable than 
that in 3ritain . According to an Associated Press report the 
Japanese were pleased and surprised that the United Staes was 
willing to set an example by s uch a drastic reduction of its navy 
4 
- launched and bu ilding ! 
~he next meeting of the Conference was scheduled for Tuesday the 
15 to. By the time the it reconvened all delegations were aware 
of the popularity of Hughes ' proposal, both in their own 
countries and abroad. In their speeches the delegates of the 
affected nations expressed their agreement with the proposal, in 
principle . Wh ile they all said that they approved the gross 
details , they also said they had reservations which they would 
fully discuss in committee with the other nations . 
Admiral Kato declared that the plan would be acceptable to . 
Japan after tonnage levels had been adjusted. The Japanese would 
fight the tonnage ratio throughout the conference until they had 
I~ 
bee n mo llified . 
Lord Balfour of Britain stated that he believed that the 
tonnage of su~marines was too high, but he would deal with it in 
cOTIl;nit t ee. ~he BrItish fear of submarines was understandable. 
During the World War German submarines had blockaded Britain. 
~h ile the b l ockade was not completely successful, . it ~id enough 
1/ 
damage to mak~ the British wary of submarines after the war. 
The two re@a i n ing great powers, Italy and France, made their 
statements. I ta~y followed the pattern of Britain and Japan in 
praisIng t r. e pr oposal but qualifying the praise . Italy's 
reservation was a reminder that the Con t inental navies could not 
b e left O ;..lt: consideration when the Conference met in 
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commIttee . P remie r Briand, speaking for .France, expressed h is 
desire to n~~p reduce the burdens of war and to pr~vent the 
horrors o f t he rec en t past from reoccuring. But he added that 
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peace cou~d not be achieved if the problems of land warfare wer e 
left unconsiderea. Also, Briand - ~ike the Italians - believed 
East, the delegates remained silent on those problems in their 
speeches. Far ~astern frictions had been relegated to committees 
composed of the second class nations and subordinate 
representatives of the first class powers. Hughes ' speech he~ped 
make limitation of naval armament the topic at the Conference. 
The delegates met in open plenary sess ions, closed committee 
meeetings, and private tete ~ tetes. On the subject of limita-
tion of armaments they found three stumbling blocks. The first 
wa s land w2.rfare , which proved to be so complicated the 
conference d=opped the subject. This distressed the French 
because It was one of the main reasons for their attendande. The 
French wanted ~and warfare discussed as they were afraId of a re-
armed Germany.. Specifically, they saw a rearmed Germany choosing 
France as its main target if it went to war. Since France had 
been instruillectal in crushing the German state at Versailles, the 
Germans would be sur e to want their vengence. Animosities 
between tne two natIons went back to the Franco-Prussian War. The 
specter of a German army would haunt the French until the Second 
wor 1d \'Jar. Briand s aid that France would disarm, if the other 
nations offereci It a guarantee of its security. Otherwise~ 
France would :ce tai n a large army. 'l'he Br i tish and the Amer icans 
6 
shIed f rom Briand ' s position, as the price of French s ecurity wa s 
too h igh, and the topic was never discussed again. Briand soon 
lif 
returned to France, as he could not accomplish hi s mi ss ion. 
~he Japanese provided the second set of problems for the 
conference. Japanese objections caused the most trouble among the 
three major nava~ powers. One objection dealt with the 5:5:3 
tonnage ratio which Hughes had proposed. The Japanese had come 
to Washington with orders to try for a ratio of 10:10:7 (United 
States, Great dritain , Japan ) . 'l'hi s would have made Japanese 
tonnage a tenth larger than that allowed in the American 
proposal. Originally, the .japanese seemed reluctant to 
accomodate themselves to the other nations. However, the United 
States decod8d all cables to and f rom the delegations, so the 
Amexicandelegatlon knew most of the instructions wh ich Tokyo 
sent to its deLegation. One of the decoded cables listed the 
postions the Japanese delegation s hould take if they could not 
obtain an asree~ent based upon their original demands. Thus the 
United States de~egation expected the Japanese eventually to fall 
15" 
back to the AmerIcan ratio - if pressed hard enough. 
~Natural.iy , the Japanese wanted something in exchange for 
accepting the ~~erican ratio. 'l'heir quid pro quo was the 
nonfortificaticn of Pacific posessions. The Japanese government 
held that an agre '2ement on nonfortification waS more important 
than one recu~lng warsnips. Japan believed ' that , in a time of 
war~ establisned oases would have more value to the combatant 
na tlons than s :'1l2s. Therefore any reduc tion , or freeze , in 
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Pacific milltary Das es would increase Japan ' s security. 
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~he other J apanese objection to the American plan was the 
aga l nst the scrapping of the Mutsu. ~he Japanese navy had 
iin i shed outfitting thi s large battleship, and it was undergoing 
shake-down trials. Tne navy had raised money for this ship by 
popular subscription. Thus, the Japanese argued that their pub~ic 
~vould not accept its scrapping and used this argument as a way to 
fight for their newest ship. The Japanese told the conference 
that they would not s i gn an agreement which would scrap the 
. 
Mutsu~ The United Sta t es could not detect any deviation from 
(7 
th is pO In t even in decoded Japanese cables . 
The Un ited States and Great Britain accepted the Japane~e 
requirements and the three powers reached an agreement. .Just as 
the Japanese de mands had two parts , the modification to the 
hughes proposal had two parts. Part one covered Pacific fortifi-
cations. In its final form this section of the treaty froze all 
fortifications in the specified parts of the Pacific at the 
levels t hen ~ ~ existence. The area of the Pacific affected in-
eluded all J 2panese and British mandates; all United States 
Pacific posessions except Hawaii; All Japanese posessions except 
for the nome isia~d si All British territorries east of Singapore 
and nor t h of Aust r alia . I n a ll cases i slands adjacent to the 
coast of exeillpted areas were also exempt . Also , this part of the 
treaty l i mit ing a r~aments provided for replacement of worn-out 
weapons as is c ustomary in peace time. Th is freeze benefited al l 
parties . The ~iller ican delegation favored it as much as the 
..J a panese . 
The reS01Jtlon o f the Mutsu problem was a l so simple. The 
t h ree nation s ad j us ted the l i s t of vesse l s to be scrapped so as 
8 
to allow the Japane se to keep the Mutsu. ~hus, the United States 
would finish construction of two more battleships and upon 
completion scrap two older ones. The British were to build two 
large battleships and to scrap four older ones. ;i'he Japanese 
could keep the Mutsu, provided that they scrap an older ship. 
Ali three nations did well by this agreement. ~he ships built 
would be newer and heavier - and therefore better - than those 
scrapped. This modification increased the upper total tonnage 
If 
limit by 25, 000 tons - but did not alter the 5:5:3 ratio. 
The British, Americans, and Japanese had solved their two 
major problems. But yet another problem about naval arms 
confronted the Conference. Tnis one would be far serious than 
any other. Now that the three great naval powers had resoLved 
their difficulties they invited the French and Italians to join 
them. The conferees from Great britain, Japan and the United 
~tates followed the American plan and decided that a fair ratio 
of s trength for tte Brench and the Italians would be at the level 
of 1.75 as cOID?ared to the British and the United States at 5 and 
the Japanese at 3. ~he British had accepted this ratio as it 
would mean tnat tneir navy was stronger than any two Eu~?pean 
navies 1.-.. -. COffiul.nea . Italy quickly accepted, since the ratio meant 
that it would have parity with Brance. The French did not 
readily accept t~e ratio . 
driand haG :e~~rned to France, but he still ran his delega-
tion from afar. S~iand told the Conference that France was not 
wilLing to aCCE?t such a limitation, 
would unduly li 2 it France's navy. 
as Italy I -.1aa, because it 
~he ¥rench stated that they 
would not accept any r atio less than that given the J apanese 
3 0U,000 tons, or 3 to the United States ' 5. ~he british 
irnmediatly rejected this proposal, as it would upset their pre-
elllinent position in Europe. If the French did not modify their 
aemands, the conference ~ould fail. 
Faced with failure, Hughes sent a personal , message to Briand 
asking him to compromise. Briand agreed and the French 
delegation accepted the ratio, but only as it applied to capital 
ships .. The French agreed to the capital ship ratio, but they 
refused to extend it to an agreement on vesels which they 
regarded as defensive. '.chus, the French reserved the right to-
build auxiliaries such as destroyers, patrol craft, cruisers, and 
submarines to levels above the ratio suggested by the Conference." 
The French refu s al to limit auxiliary craft did not rest 
well with the riritish delegation. From the beginning of the 
confere~ce the British had pressed for the elimination of the 
submarine as a le3~timate warship - they wanted it outlawed. Now 
the French were telling the British in effect that they would 
build so many submarines that the British anti-submarine craft 
could not central the seas around Britain. ~his the British 
would never accept. In the end, this dispute was never resolved. 
AS a resu~t tee fina l agreement among the naval powers ~id not 
cover auxil~ ary combatants. The agreement only covered th~ 
capital ship . 
One other poi nt which the nations discussed had to do with a 
ne w type of =ombatant ship - the aircraft carrier. The British 
had developed ~nis ship during the war. rllthough its future uses 
were not c~ea= , most nations thougnt that it would be an impor-
Hi 
tant part of the i r fleets . The powers agreed to treat carriers as 
a type of capital ship and applied the system of ratios to tnem 
as they had to capital craft. Thus, the United btates and Great 
britain were each allowed 135 ,000 tons and the other nations a 
corresponding amount. Also , any nation which wanted to could 
conve r t any two ships due to be scrapped by terms of the treaty 
into aircraft carriers of up to 33 ,000 t ons, an increase of 6 ,000 
tons over the normal limit for carriers. In the l~20s the United 
~tates tooK advantage of this and proceeded to convert two ships 
due to be scrapped into 33,000 ton aircraft carriers - the 
Lexington And Saratoga of World War II fame. The Japanese also 
converted two vessels slated two be scrapped into carriers - the 
QO 
Amagi and the Kaga, b ut these ships were only 26,000 tons each . 
The final forr:! of the Five flower treaty - or the Washington 
treaty - limited the American, British , Japanese , French , and 
l talian navi.es . The capital ship tonnage of these nations 
followed the ratio of 5 :5:3:1.7S:I.75, with the United States and 
Great Britain each with a total of 525, 000 tons. ':rhe treaties 
also limited aircraft carriers to the same ratio - but a lower 
total tonnage. In addition to limiting capital ships by tonnage 
the treaty limite6 them qualitatively. Capital ships were those 
greater t ha n 10 , 00 0 tons and no more than 3 5 , 000 tons. fl'heir 
guns had to b e gr e ater than 8-inches and no more than 16-inches. 
b imil ar restr ic~ions applied to aircraft carriers. 'l'he 1" i ve 
Power treaty successfully provided for the limitation of capital 
Sh ip s ~l In effect the three great naval powers now nad their own 
sep erate zone 3 of control: The Un ited btate s in the Easter n 
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Pacific, Wester n Atlantic, alld around the coast of the Americas; 
Japan in the Western Pacific; Great Britain in the Eastern 
~tlantic and the waters around and between the parts of the 
~mpire. But the absence of auxiliary vessels from the treaty 
would prove to be a mistake which the three great naval powers 
later regretted. 
The naval powers had been limited by the Five-Power treaty. 
At least in the category of capital ships. The topics which 
remained for the Conference involved the "Far Eastern Questions". 
~nese questions could be divided into two major areas. The first 
dealt with the problem of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The ·other 
dealt with the 'problem ' of China. The nations pursued these 
questions simultaneously with the discussion of arms control, and 
one waited on the outcome of the other. 
Tne Anglo-Japanese Alliance was an antiquated treaty. It 
was designed by i ts signatories for the world situation prior to 
World War I. Af~er the war it had become an embarrassment to 
Britain and ~apan as well as an annoyance to the United States 
which seemed to ~e the only possible nation it was aim~d against. 
The British considered it to be the most important topic under 
discussion at the Conference. They postponed a final decision on 
naval lirnita~lcn until they knew the outcome of the disc~ssions 
on a replace~en~ to the Alliance. 
Any treaty replacing the Alliance had to be acceptable to 
all parties. In order for the Americans to accept it, the treaty 
had to be one ~hich did not ~ommit the United States to any 
action beyone consulting with the other powers in the event of an 
internationaL crisIs. For Britain the new treaty needed the 
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appearance of an alliance so that Great Britain would not look as 
if it was betraYIng its ally Japan. ~or the same reason Japan 
wanted the treaty to seeem to be an alliance, otherwise the 
Japanese would lose face by accepting a watered down verSlon of 
the original treaty. Also, the treaty needed a statement 
respecting the security of all parties and their posessions. ~his 
was needed to make it acceptable t6 the British Pacific 
Dominions. Finally, the three large naval powers took cognizance 
of the fact that France was a Pacific power, and they invited 
France to sign - but only after they had drawn up the treaty. A 
benefit gained from the inclusion of France was that it lessened 
the appearance of the treaty merely being the old alliance with 
~l 
the United States included. 
The end product of this combination of national needs was 
the Four Power treaty. It was a snort treaty. It pledged each 
signatory natlon to respect the rights and security of the 
others. It c02mi~ted the nations to consult with one another in 
the event a~o~her power threatened aggressive action against a 
signatory natic~. They were also required to consult in 
situations where ~i nor controversies existed which could not be 
settled by regular diplomacy. In all, it was a noble so~nding 
document whicn ~o2@itted the parties to do nothing more than talk 
to resolve pr~b~e~s . However, this was what all the parties, 
~3 
especialll] the Un~ted States, wanted - a treaty with no 'teeth '. 
On the 5~~ject of China, the nations produced one major 
treaty and se~e~3l ~inor resolutions. The major treaty was the 
Ni ne Power trea:y. all participants at the Conference signed 
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thi s . dasically, it pledged the nation s to uphold the ?rinciples 
of the Open Door in China. The contracting nations agreed to 
respect the independence, sovereignity, and territorial and 
administrative Integrity of China; to provide China the 
opportunity to es tablish a stable national government; and to 
respect the principle of equal economic opportunity to all 
nations throughout China. Finally, the s ignatories pledged to 
refrain from acts which would abridge the rights of the other 
signatory nations and their nationals in China. The other 
treatIes ana resolutions on China all re-enforced the principle 
of the Open Door. Like the E'our-Power treaty these ,agreements on 
'J.Lf 
China had sections on enforcement, just consultations. 
The Chinese had one more topic which they wante6 se ttled ~ 
the former German concession in Shantung. In conversations 
wh ich the United States meditated the Japanese reluctantly agreed 
to hand over to Ci1ina the right to govern and also sold them the 
economic key to "'bo~ L..:. .. _ area - the Shantung .. '1 ~5 Ral way. All things 
considered , the ChInese did fairly well for themselves at the 
Conference. 'l'he~l did not hana out any new concessions, and 
managed to have so~e returned. There was a pledge to respect 
China's status as a sovereign nation and the hint that ·China 
might some day be free of the unequal treaties. 
Siberia was yet another topic. Its s ituation was qui te like 
China's. The Japaanese had occupied a part of the old Russian 
Empire, and were stQbborn about leaving. At the Conference the 
United States and Great Britain persuaded the Japanese to 
re l inquish their position ther e. To the amazement of many who 
distrusted the J apanese they kept their promise and evacuated 
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bioeria by the end of 1922. 
.Finally, the United States and Japan settled a matter wh ich 
had strained their relationship. This was the matter of the 
Japanese mandates in the Pacific. The Japanes had been given the 
German in~ular posessions in the Pacific at the Paris Peace 
Conference. 'l'heLeague of L'oJations subsequently confirmed this 
mandate. The United States did not agree to the disposit i on of 
the islands. It claimed that since it was not a memoer of the 
League the United States still retained rights to the area. 
bpec i fically, the United States said that Japan needed to obtain 
an additional mandate from the United States. At the Conference 
the two nations were able to reach an accord on the matter. The 
Uni ted States gave Japan a mandate to the islands and the United 
States and its nationals received the same rights in the mandates 
as Japan and its nationals. The Un1ted States whad been 
especially worriec over the status of the cable and radio center 
on the island of Yap, as American cables passed through it. With 
the agreeme~t ~etween t he nations, American rights were 
_ ~7 
protectea. 
~he Washingto~ Conference concluded in February of 1922; It 
was considered by n any to be a stunning success. Its trea ties 
had set a pat t e r n for the future . This was a pattern of real-
istic negotiatio~s on concrete issues and principles . The powers 
were not committe d to the obligations of a League of Nations; 
wnich they jil lg h t HOL control. Instead they were l iable to a 
small e r debt , w~ icn tney could choose to accept , or not accept , 
by the act of s:g ~ing an agreeement . The ancient methods of 
1 5 
diploillacy nad been revived by the United State s , and had prcduced 
the first modern treaty which resulted in the voluntary reduction 
of arms. ~hi s wa s something the League would never match. 
Whether or not the tr e aties were obeyed was another matter, one 
which bore watching. I f they were followed it would be a ser ious 
cha~lenge to the League. If they were not obeyed, then it would 
prove the contentions of some that old-fashioned diplomacy was 
ban~rupt and that now the only way nations could provide for 
their common security was through a League of Nations. 
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Chapter V 
!t'roIn,vashington to Geneva: 1922-1927 
~ne Washington Conference of l~21-1922 produced three 
1:reaties. They were the Five, Four, and Nine Power Treaties. 
Many observers, at the time and later, believed that the Five 
Power treaty was the most important of the three treaties - it 
was often referred to as the Washington treaty. 'rh is treaty 
provided for a reduction of capital ships among the United 
States, Great Britain, Japan, France, and Italy. These nations 
li@lted their battle fleets to a tonnage ratio of 5:5:3:1.75:1.75 
respectively with total tonnage for the United States set at 
5 00,00U tons as the benchmark. 
~he next most important treaty was the Four Power treaty. 
This was a pact, among the United States, Great dritain, Japan, 
and France, which attempted to maintain the status-quo in the 
Pacific. The cont=acting parties were obliged to consult with 
each other if any of them had differences which could not be 
sol ved by nor:-aal diplo;na tic methods. Also, a contracting power 
could call a meet:ng of the signatories if it was threatened by 
an any natIon. Thi s ~reaty did not commit any party to use fo~ce 
only to ta lk. 
Tne t h ird asreem2nt , the Nine Power treaty , re-iterated the 
pr inc ipla of t h e J;;;,en Door aillong a1.1 nations with regard to 
" . . 
<.....tllna. Also , the si3ners of the Nine Power treaty the United 
States , Great Britain . Japan , France , I taly, the ~etherlands, 
Portuga l, Belgium , a~~ Cn ina - intended that China be kept open 
~o al l nations a~~ '-hat the Chinese should be allowed to develop 
1 
t~ e i r own national government - within limi ts defined by previous 
treaties . But this treaty , liKe the Four Power treaty , had no 
provisions for enforcement. 
Combined, these three treaties were s4Pposed to lessen 
tensions among the great naval powers of the Pacific - Un itea 
btates , Great Britain, Japan - and to maintain the status-quo 
among all with i n terests in the Pacific and China. AS a result 
of the Washington Conference, international goodwill was at the 
h ighest level since the Armistice of l~lB. During the 1920s this 
would change for the worse. ~his change would be the result of 
internal events and pressures in each of the signatory nations 
synergistically combining to lessen the soothing effect the 
Washington treaties had had on international relations. 
In toe United States, the Five Power treaty resulted in 
Congress sharply reducing the Navy's budget request . Even before 
al~ the partle s haa signed the treaty, Congress assuming passage 
of the treaty , c o ntemplated cuts in the navy. Congress was eager 
to cut t he navy ' s budg et. In the opinion of most Congressmen it 
followed that SlDce the navy no longer had to man as many ships 
as before t he t r e aty, t hen the navy should reduge the personnel 
under i t.3 co;rc,:an ::l. Secretary of the Navy Edwin Den~y and 
Assistant ciecretar y Roosevelt accepted this reduction in 
principle t hey a; r eed that the navy needed fewer men - but did 
not accept tne l ow numbers which the Congressional Naval Affairs 
Committees ~antea . After a prolonged battle the navy saved some 
JOos, bu t cou. l. j Dot save all that the'y wan ted.1. 
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AS a resu lt of 
this lack o f p e rso n ne l the navy placed ships out of commission 
an d put oth e r snip s i n reserve . ~hese reductions were in addition 
to those manda ted by the 1:' i ve Bower treaty?- (AS a resul t of ttl i s 
forced 'mothballing' of part of the fleet, these ships waul be in 
good condition for World War 11. Most of them were destroyers 
woich were lent to Great Britain.) 
~he majority of naval offIcers in the United State~ did not 
thlnk that the United States benefited from the Five Power 
treaty. Many of them belived that by signing the treaty the 
United States had given up a strong position in the Western 
Pacific while not receiving anything in return. 'l'hey v iewed the 
treaty as a great victory for the Japanese and British navies. 
in general, the professionals in the American navy viewed 
nonfortification of Pacific islands as a strategic asset to Japan 
and a liablity to toe United States. According to one outspoken -
retired - officer, the limitation of 
Pacific cnansed the ratio from 5:5:3 to 
fortifications in the 
3 
5:5 :10. However, this 
view did not 2ccount for the past attitude of Congress toward 
• 'iavy and Ar~y requests for fortification appropriations • 
distorica11l l Congress had not been in favor of fortifying the 
~hi~ippines a~d Guaill , and had not appropriated the monies needed 
to turn _ eitner of these possessions into a major base. .doth 
.uodge ~nd Ur:derwooci had told Hughes that it appeared that . this 
Congressional a~tlt~ae would continue. Thus, at the Conference, 
the State Departffient thought that the United States could only 
benef i t fro:.. a fortiflcations freeze in the Western Pacific in 
~lght of the fact that Japan was continuing to build-up its bases 
* 
in the region , 3~C the Unitej States was not building any. 
* ~his aL~=e=ence between State and ~avy is a good example of 
[ 
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American office r s be l ieved that the om i ss ion of merchant 
S hi pS from e s timate s of naval s trength in the Five Power treaty 
gave an advantag e to the britsh who possessed the larges t 
. . . ~ 
merchant fleet In the world. 
~he poor American st~ate9ic postition in the Pacific - as 
the officer s s aw it - combined with a reduction of the size of 
the navy in ships and personnnel, and thus the chance to command, 
did not produc a high l evel of morale in the officer corps of the 
united States Navy . 
Naval officer s in Great Britain and Japan wer e a lso unhappy 
about the resu l ts of the Washington .Conference. As ~~g~ later 
said, the Conference must have done something right for, to h im, 
one sign of a falr treaty was when no party was completely 
r-
satisfied? The British were unhappy because the Five Power 
treaty forced Britain to concede to the U~ited States and Japan 
their own naval zones of control. brittania no longer ruled the 
waves , on~l so~e of them. Also, the British officers believed 
that Britain s ho u ~d have received_ more recognition of Britain ' s 
the clash bet~een the State Department' s and the nava l officer s ~ 
world view tn ro~ghout the period prior to World War II. The State 
Department usually included domestic and foreign realiti~~ in its 
analysis of t he w~rld s ituation. Often the naval officers' view 
d i d not acccunt for many domestic and for e ign realities. As the 
world sit ~ ation ~or sened in the 1~ 3 0s the State Department ' s and 
tne naval of f ice rs ' vi ewpoint s came together. This convergence 
was the resu~t of the deterioration of world peace to a l evel 
consonant wl t n t ne officer s ' dire predictions . 
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dependence on its sea lanes. ~hey wanted Britain to have a 
higher total tonnage, 
b 
communication. 
to compensate tor its long lines of 
Many, but not most, Japanese naval officers believed that 
the Japanese delegation had betrayed Japan by accepting a ratio 
lower than 10:10:7 (United States, Britain, Japan.) By the early 
l~30s with many of the older, moderate, retired from the Japanese 
Navy this view that the Japanese delegates had betrayed Japan at 
Washington became the majority view of the Japanese navy; with 
the militarization of the Japanese government during the 1~30s it 
became the government view. This belief of the militari that 
Japan's delegates had betrayed their nation would be a key factor 
in the ultimate collapse of the Washington treaty and its 
7, 
successors . 
Domestic events in the United States contributed to the 
erosion or tne goodwill engendered by the Washington Conference. 
In 1 924 tte United States enacted a new immigration law. It 
reduced tne nu~ber of immigrants allowed into the United States 
per year. It ac h ieved this reduction by limiting immigration 
from all nati.ons with a quota system. 'fhis quota system lunitea 
eacn nation to a c:::Pt- number of people who could emmigrate 'to the 
United States eaCh year. However, the l~24 law alowed no 
immigration at 2.11 from Japan. 'fhis exclusion did not help 
relations betwee n the United States and Japan. Secretary of 
State Hugnes was so offended that he seriously considered 
resigning I n pr o test . His counterpart in Japan did resign.' 













whenever they wished to drum up anti-American feelings. As the 
years passed and Anti-American feel ing grew, more Japanese 
polIticians and military officers convince~ themselves that the 
act was a standing insult to Japan and should be righted. 
Helations between the United ~tates and Great Britain were 
better than those between Japan and the United ~tates, but they 
were not the best possible. In the United States the Navy 
League, an organization devoted to promoting the United States 
Navy, engaged in a practice long known as 'twisting the British 
Lion's tail l • In the 1920s the 'twist' consisted of comparing 
the United . ~tates navy with the ' stronger ' British navy and then 
stating that the United States navy needed more ships to meet the 
' threat' posed by the British navy. Privately the Navy League 
and the naval officers who supported it considered Japan to be a 
far greater threat to the United States, but Britain was a safer 
'public' t hreat. Wh ile a war with Britain was not likely, the 
United Sta~es government viewed a war with Japan, over commercial 
'rivalries ' , as more likely and did not want any 'destabilizing' 
statements made which might further damage relations between the 
United Sta~es and Japan. Also, any ships which Congress allowed 
the Unite s 6~ates navy to build could just as easily be used 
against Japa~ as Britain. The British government did not 
appreciate =i is twisting of the British tail. Among other 
matters w~ ich aggravated relations beteeen the United States and 
Great Brita i~ ~ere British control of most global cable and 
radio-teleg~a?~ corporations. Although relations were 'not poor , 
they cou~a aave . b 9 oeen etter. 
The f lnal element wh ich contributed to the deterioration of 
b 
relations among the Uni ted States , Great Britain, and Japan was 
the continued increase of the latter two nations' navies in non-
restricted categories . The United States navy was growing, but 
not as fast as the navies of Japan and Great britain. The 
Genera l Board of the United States navy believed that cruisers 
were the most important of the unrestricted categories. Both 
Br i tain and Japan had more cruisers than the United States. 
Although Japanese and British cr u isers were not always as good as 
the American cruisers , in the estimate of the General Board both 
nations had too many for the United States to ignore. The 
General Board wanted this situation corrected as soon as 
'b'" !~ POSSI .le. 
Reactions i n Congress to this ' cr u iser gap ' ranged from 
total support of the General Board viewpoint to the attitude that 
the navy needeG more reductions . The maJority view held that the 
navy needed ~ore ships, but not as many as the navy had 
requested. hlsc, illBny Congressmen thought that the United States 
should cal~ an international conference to restrict the classes 
of warships wnich the Wash i ngton Conference had not limi ted. 
1'h us, in the LS20s whenever Congress legislated an increase in 
the navy I ~ne aULhorizat i on usually had a rider which urged the 
II 
President to ~all another conference . 
After ~De aeat h of President Harding i n 1923 , Calvin 
Coolidge Jecaille ~resident. In 1924 , Coolidge tried to call a 
conference of tne signatories to the Five Power treaty but this 
effort failea due to French intransigence. The French government 
be l ieved tna~ Land armaments were more important than navl ones 
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and thought tnat it was more likely to obta in its goals of se-
curity from Germany through the League of Nations than through a 
naval conference .'1 
In l~26 it became apparent to the United States government 
that the continued British and Japanese build~up in cruisers 
\vould force the United States either to build more cruisers at a 
faster rate or convince the other nations to reduce their navies. 
~hus, in 1927 Coolidge again tried to call a conference among the 
Five Power signatories. Cooliage proposed that the conference be 
held at Geneva , Switzerland, ~s all five nations had military and 
diplomatic representatives there. These representatives wete at 
Geneva as mem!::>ers of the Preparatory Commission for a conference 
on General DIsarmament wh ich the Leauge of Nations had called. 
The United States had sent a delegation ' to this League event as 
_ _ _ , . 13 
the conference d eaLt onLy wIth arms control. 
Response to the Coolidge invitation was mixed. Britain 
and Japan b oth said that they would attend; the .french and 
italians ~ec l ined. The French claimed that if they attended the 
American conference they would be betraying the League of Na-
tions. A!"id , :~ a n apparent reference to the United States, the 
French s aid that they would not abandon their commitment to the 
League . Also, the French knew that the Amer ican sponsore..d 
conference ~ould not deal with land armaments, which were of 
paramount importa nce to the Brench. 'l'hus, the French would not 
attend. ~he Italians gave similar reasons. They belived that 
the ~eague co~ld solve the problem of armament reduction by 
taking it a s a ~nule - not peicemeal as the Amereicans proposed. 
As fina lly arr ang ed the conference was held in Geneva, starting 
on J une 20th l~~7. The conferees were the United States , Great 
1'-1 
britain , and Japan . France and Italy sent observers. 
The Geneva Conference opened with each nation presenting its 
mvn proposal.. The proposals were not congruent. Most observers 
realized that an agreement would not come easily. 'fhe Br i tish 
wanted substatntial changes in the Washington treaty. 'fhese 
changes included extending the life of the treaty; extending the 
l ife of ships before obsolescence; decreasing the maximum size 
aLlowed to battleships; reducing the size of guns aboard battle-
ships; reducing the tonnage of aircraf t carriers; abolition of 
submarines; and the creation of two classes of cruisers.'~ 
The Bmerican proposal dealt only with topics whi ch the 
Washington treaty did not cover. In particular it proposed the 
div i sion of t he unr estricted ships into four classes; with the 
tonnage ratio o f 5:5:3 as applied to these classes wi th lower and 
upper tonnage limi ts acceptable to the United States The 
first , a cr ui ser c l ass to be limited to 250 ,00 to 300,000 tons 
e a ch for ~h 2 U~ it2d S t ates and Great Britain, 150 ,000 io 180,000 
tons for Jaj?an . ~he next class of ships was destroyers . Her'e 
the United ~ ta tes s uggested tonnages of 200,000 to 250 ,000 tons 
for itself anJ Great Brita in, 120,000 to 150,000 for Japan. 
Submarines co~posd the th ird class. This class was limited tp 
60,0 0 U t o ;O!GO~ t on s for the United States and Great Britain, 
and a l ower a~ou~t f or Japan, 36 ,000 to 54,000 tons. 'l'he final 
class was one o f minor combat vessels , the limits of wh ich the 
/6 
Uni te State s di~ Do t delineate . 
~he 0 a~anese proposal was vaguer than the other two 
na t ions '. It sug'.;J es ted ti1at the navi es limit themselves at the 
current level of naval strength - thi s 'nava~ s trength ' included 
ships authorized but not yet under construction. if the other 
nations had accepted the Japanese proposal then Japan would have 








most important con f lict among 
of cruisers . 'rhe cause was 
States and Great Britain over 
class. 'rhe United States and 
the nations was in the 
disagreement between the 
the definition of the 
Great Britain held two 
di f ferent views on the functions of crui sers . Hence, they also 
held two different views of the ' best' cruiser . ]:Jaturally both 
the United States and Great Britain wanted to have as many of the 
' best' cruisers as possible. The probl~m was in reaching a 
compromi s e be t we e n the se two nations ' goals. 
Tne A~erican navy had decided that the type of cruiser it 
ne2ded w~s one capaole of mounting a-inch-guns - the largest gun 
allowed by the Wa s hington Conference for non-capital s hips. In 
addition , t ee United States wanted as many of thes e guns as 
possible ':::; i} cG.ch cruiser provided tha t i't had the rang e to ope-
rate in ~ne PaCl~lC. ~he United States navy wanted to maximiz e 
rang e and n~~be = of guns; to do this it needed the largest ship 
poss ibl e , w~ic~ wou ld weigh 10,000 ton s , the heav iest the Wa sh-
ington treaty aLLowed non-capital ships. Thus, the United States 
came to the con ferenc e with a demand for at l eas t twenty-five 
If 
10,000 to~ cr u isefs e a ch mounting ci-inch-guns. 
The 3ri~ish c r uiser was a different breed . The Bri t iish did 
not need giant cruisers capable of steaming from Honolu lu to 
10 
~okyo without replenishment. What the British wanted was a 
smalle r ship which could protect its merchant vessels from 
commer ce raider s as they travelled between the port s of the 
.t::;npire. Also the British did not f ee l tnat S - inch guns were 
necessary. They believed that a ship with 6 or 7-inch-guns would 
be a better ship a s more guns could ~e placed aboard. Also, the 
smaller ship with lighter guns could have more armor, as less 
weight would be devoted to guns than on an S-inch gunned ship. 
~inally, with ships which weighed less, the British could build 
more s hips befor e r eaching their total tonnage limit than if they 
had built the IO,OaO ton S-inch-gun ships. Thu s , the Briti s h 
/9 
would have more cruisers to protect the Empir e '"s lifeline. 
Tne problems that this difference on cruisers raised were 
s imple i the s olu tio!1 was not. The Briti~h did not want the 
United States to use its enti re tonnag e allownance on the U- inch 
10,000 ton cr~ iser . The BritIsh thought that if the Ameri cans 
bui l t all heavy cruisers then they would have to respond in kind. 
The Britisn belleved that they would have to build more heavy 
c r u iser s so as to illaintatin parity with the United States and to 
maintain their ~ead over Japan. This building of heavy cruisers 
by the BritiSh would mean that they could not build as many of 
the smaller ones which the British Admiralty thought to be the 
better ship. rh e U~ited States wanted to build at least twenty-
fi v e heavy cr Ji sers , a number which the British were not prepared 
to accept. the United States did not want the British to 
hav e the Larse number of small c ruise rs which" the British 
desired. I~ the 3ritish built many small c ru i ser s , then the 
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United States would be forced to ' wa ste " i ts precious t o nn a ge 
alot traent by building similar s h ips to counter the number of 
sh ip s i n the British f l eet . 
The cruiser issue came tq a head in early July, at the 
second and third plenary session of the Conference. The British 
stated that they needed at least seventy cruisers - twenty-five 
to operate with the fleet and the rest tv be stationed around the 
empire. To reach this level of seventy cruisers the Briti s h 
wanted a mi n imum total tonnag e limit of 400,000 ton~ . 400,000 
tons was the lowest figure acceptable to the British , in fact 
their fir s t proposal called for 590,000 tons. This limit would 
allO'.oJ the required seventy ships each of them to be 
approx i mately 6 ,000 tons and armed with 6-inch-guns. Then , as a 
so~ution to tne problem dividing the Conference , the Britis h 
proposed two categories of cruise r s. The first category would 
consist of t he heavy 1 0,000 ton a-inch -gun cruiser. '1'ne second 
type of cruiser would be lighter, and armed with 6-inch, or 
smaller , gu :-. s . '1;he Britsh were willing to compromise within 
these ca~egories . But , the American delegation rejected this, as 
the A~ericar. ~aval delegates believed that no matter what size 
the ship it shou l d mount a-inch guns. Thi s was unacceptable to 
the Brit i sh for they did not place as much faith in the 8 - inch 
';).0 
gun as their Ailierican counterparts. 
The con f e r e nce appeared to have stalemated on the issue of 
cru i sers a~d t h e desire of the United States to have few 
approximately twen ty-five - heavy cruisers and the britis h desire 
to have at lea st seventy light cruisers. The British delegation 
returned to ~o2don t o explain the situation to the Cabinee. The 
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Cabinet in formed tne delegates, Viscount Cecil and First Lord of 
the AOHliralty briCigeman, that there w6Uld be no compromise below 
400,000 tons and above twelve heavy cruisers each for the United 
States and . . ~ I . - 1 . Great Britain. ~he Amerelcan ae egatlon was also 
adamant. Tne prime reason for the American refusal to compromise 
below twenty-five heavy cruisers was that the American delegation 
was dominated by naval officers who were unwilling to go below 
the cruiser levels set by the General Board. These officers were 
skilled in their profession, but they were not diplomats and 
. . d . ~:L could not see the benefits to be galne by compromise. 
Thus, on August 4th the Conference adjourned without a 
treaty. While it had produced some agreement aillomg the powers on 
the limiting characteristics of destroyers and submarines, the 
difference between the United States and Great Britain on the 
characteristics and numbers of cruisers was Clle rock upon which 
the conference was wrecked. 
Initially , i n the United States, the government and the 
press laid the failure of the conference on the British and, to a 
lesser extent, ~he United States delegation - which in hindsight 
appeared to have been top-heavy with naval officers. In Britain 
the British govern:nent and press blamed the United titates more 
than they blamed the British delegation for the failure. Anti-
Britisn senti~ent in the United States was increased when one of 
the British de~esates , Viscount Cecil , resigned from the Conser-
vat l ve gover ~~en~, and newspapers published hi s reason for 
leaving offIce. ~ord Cecil's reason was that he could not wor k i n 
a government w~ ich delibe rately refused to compromise i n order to 
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obtain disarmawent . Lord Cec il blamed his government ' s 
unwIllingne ss to compromise for the failure of the Conference. 
'l'his i ntensified the feeling in the United States against a 
rlr i tain which appeared unwilling to give naval parity to the 
United States. ~his belief in turn aggravated the poor relations 
betYleen the Uni ted States and Great Br i tain?3 
Finally, ' as a result of the collapse ot the Conference, 
President Coolidge in an address to Congress, in early December 
1927, asked for an increase in the navy. On December 14th the 
Chairman of the BouSe Naval Afffairs Committee introduced a bill 
for seventy-one new ships. This bill was a copy of the General 
Board ' s own estimate of the number of ships the navy needed. The 
large number of ships and the associated expenditures provoked 
heated discussion in Congress and as a result the number of new 
ShIPS was reduced to fifteen cruisers and one aircraft carrier • 
.even this lower number of new ships had trouble passing an 
economy minded CQngress. But in February of 1~29 the bill finally 
';)..1-( 
passed Congress and the President signed it into law. 
Since the ~~lted States could not reduce Great Britain's and 
Japan's navies to a level which the United States could accept 
throug h a trsatYi the United States resumed major naval 
construction to regain parity with Great Britain and superiority 
over Japan. Tnere remained two more possibilities for naval 
limitation in the near future. The first was the League of 
Nations ' talks cn General Disarmament, which were in the 
preparatory stage. The second possibil i ty was another naval 
conference. ~he ~ashington treaty caLled for another conference 
by the end of 1 9 3L, but before that conference the United States 
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and Great Hritaln would need to mend their relationship and 
settle their naval differences ; otherwise , 
would be a repeat of Geneva . 
1 5 
the next conference 
Cdh.P'l'.c.;1{ VI 
After Geneva: L~27-1930 
~he Geneva Conference of 1927 faiLed to limit nonrestricted 
warships of the United States, Great Britain, and Japan. As a 
result of this failure, relations among these nations stead ily 
deteriorated. Relations between - the United States and Japan 
worsened, but only slightly until 1931. However, relations 
between tbe United States and Great Britain were hurt the most by 
the collapse of the Geneva Conference. ~he years from 1927 to 
1~30 were the worst in twentieth-century Anglo-American 
relations. Although many important members of the British and 
American governments felt that a war between their nations was 
unlikely, they were worried that tne recent talk of war by 
jingoists could leaa to war. 
i, J-
"L. one point, when it was apparent that the Geneva 
Conference would fail, the British Ambassador to the United 
States, Si r ~s~e cloward, asked Secretary of State Frank Kellogg 
and Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover to think of a way to 
calm down t22 American press, jingoists, and navy propaga~dists 
who were. talki~g of war. After the collapse of the Conference, 
l10vlard beca.me CO:1V inced tha t there were many people in the Uni ted 
States wno tnGugnt that war between Great Britain and the United 
States was very likely. In ad6ition, Howard found that his own 
naval attache th~ught that if war did occur, Great Britain would 
eas ily w ~n . riowa~d could not believe that such an attitude could 
be found i:l 3:1 officer of the Royal Navy in such a sensitive 
post. Howard nlmself thought that if war did break out, Canada 
1 
VloU.ld declare itsel f neutral and that other DOioinions might 
possioly follow suit. For Howard neu t ra.lity among the Domin ions 
would be the beginn ing of the end of the .t;mpire, and must be 
1-
avoided at a ll costs. 
'l'he failure of ti1e Geneva Conference embarrassed the 
Coolidge administration . Partly to compensate for the .lack of a 
nava l limitation treaty , Coolidge and Kellogg adpoteci the idea of 
an international agrement to 'outlaw war ' . ~his idea of an 
agreement prohibiting warfare had its beginning in a stat~ment 
of French Foreign Minister Aristide Br~and. On the tenth 
ann iversary of the American entry into World War I , April 6th 
1927, Briand suggested tnat the United States and France enter 
Into a treaty of eternal frendship and renounce war as an 
instrument of policy between the two countries. ('l'h is 
renunciation - or outlawing - of war was not a new idea. An 
American citizen, ~.o. Levinson , had originally proposed it in 
the early 192 0 s . ) In June Briand sent a draft treaty to 
Washington. But Kellogg did not accept this proposal, as he 
believed that it wou.ld look like a bilateral treaty of alliance . 
And i t wou le severely limit American options if ever ~rance were 
. . . d ~ to go to war wltn a thlr party. 
In splte of the fact that the State Department had had a 
copy o f Bri and ' s prop osal since June , The French suggestion for a 
treaty to 'ou tlaw' war langushed until after the Geneva 
Confe r ence hac ad journea . It was not until December that Kellogg 
repl i ed to Briand. Kellogg said that he thought a more suitable 
treaty wou le be a mult iLatera l one . In addition , the fact that 
the treati e s of arbitra t ion (Hoot treaties ) between the United 
:2 
btates and ~rance , Great rlrita in and J apan were due to expire 
caused Kellogg to suggest that any new treaty also be a 
replacement for the t reaties of arbitration.
3 
The Kellogg reply to Briand's draft dissappoi n ted Briand. 
out he was nontheless willing to accept a multilateral treaty 
outlawing ¥_ ." - t b . war. BrIana nad reason 0 e unnappy. His original 
draft treaty would have had the effect of tying Amereica ' s hands 
if France ever went to war with another nation. Hh ile Briand's 
proposal was not an alliance, which would have obligated the 
United States to side actively with France in a war, it would 
have prevented the United States from Siding with the nation with 
wh ich France was at war . If Briand had been able to obtain a 
Uni ted States agreement to his original draft , he would have 
achieved a large part of his goal of obtaining France ' s security 
from a re-armed Germany. (Th is was the same goal Briand had 
espoused at t h e Washington Conference of l~2 l.) 
Kel l ogg , for h is part, did not want the United States to 
engage in ~ny thing wh ich even had the appearence of an alliance, 
for he kneW he would never be able to obtain ratification from 
the Senate .. Ai. so , Kellogg thought that such a treaty would not be 
in the best interest of the . United State~ because it would 
severely l i mi t Aillerica ' s course of action if another ~uropean war 
erupted. .F inally, Kellogg was willing to accept a weak 
mu ltilateral r enunciation of war because he knew that such a pact 
would hav e c o ~eans of enforcement and essentialy would be only a 
moral statement by the signatories saying that they would · 
arbitrate and ~ot f · . 5'" h· . 19ht. ~ IS IS not to say that Kellogg thought 
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a mora~ statement would not do any good, but the convention would 
be more of an international guideline, than an agreement among 
the signatories that they would never fight each other again. 
The treaty for the renunciation of war - or as i t is 
commonly known the Paris Peace Pact - was s i gned in Paris in 
AUgUst of 1~28 and came into effect in 1~2~ . By 1935 nearly all 
nations had signed the treaty. 
G 
from war remained to be seen. 
Whether it would deter nations 
In otner areas of foreign policy the Uni ted ~tates began to 
take a more active role . 'rhis was especially true wit h regard to 
League-sponsored events . Tne United States oecarne an active - if 
unofficial member - in many of the League ' s activities. For 
example , it continued to be a member in the League's Preparatory 
Commission for a General Conference on Disarmament. Also, the 
United States was a signatory to the Geneva Conferences on 
Prisoners of War , Rights of Medical Personnel i n War Zones , The 
Warsaw Convention on Civil Aviation, and a number of other 
treaties . ~ne most important of these League conventions which 
the Unlted S~ates signed was the one establishing a Permanent 
Court of International Justice at the Hague. It appeared that 
the United Scates was taking its place in the League - albeit 
informally and ~itn restrictions. The foreign relations of the 
United States were stable, althoug h there were some tensions 
between it 2nd other 
. 7 
natlons . 
In Xarc~ of 1929 Herbert Hoover became President of the 
United States . As hi s Secretary of State he appointed Henry 
Stimson, a ~ew York lawyer . Hoover wanted his foriegn policy to 
be characterl z ed by an increasing commitment to world peace and 
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cooperation . ~hUS , he continued the policy at associating the 
Uni ted ~tates with League act ivities, when tne ac tiv ities were 
not prejudicial to the best interes t s of toe Unitea States. 
Also , Hoover stressed the continuation of the attempt to limit 
arms , both land and naval. To effec t t he reduction of the former 
the United States continued to participate in the League 
pre l imInary conferences which had that as their aim. But the 
reduction of iand armaments .ap~eared to be years away . More 
importantly, Hoover thought that the limitation of naval 
armaments was something which could be acomplished in the near 
future. Stimson agreed with Hoover on the isssue of naval 
limItation. Additionally , StilRson - who was an avowed Anglophile 
- beiieved that if an agreement could be reached on naval power 
it would erase the negative effects on Anglo-American relatIons 
of the failure of the Geneva Naval Conference. To this end , 
Stimson ordered tne American funbassador to Great Britain, Charles 
~ 
Dawes, to begin informal conversations on naval disarmament. 
Just as there was a new government in the United States 
which was ciedlcated to naval limitation, the governmen t of Great 
Britain had a~so changed and was fuore inclined to compromise than 
the previous - Conservative - one. The head of the new British 
government was J. Ramsay MacDonald, the head of the Labor party. 
MacDonald ~as as eager as Hoover to obtain an accord on naval 
the ~a~or party had traditionally been in favor of arms 
controi , more so tnan the Conservatives. 
There were three additional incentives for a solution to the 
Anglo-American lmpasse. The first was the Great Depression • . The 
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depression was hurting people al~ over the world. Current 
econrnnic thought held that to help the economy recover government 
must reduce expenditures, reduce taxes , and balance the budget -
In addition, iDOSt governmen ts tr ied to help their domestic 
economies by protectionist methods such as tariffs and other 
trade barriers. All of these policies were common before 
Keynesian economics, which becail1e popular in the late 1930s. '1'0 
the British and American governments any military budget cuts 
which they could make - without placing their security in danger 
- were good as they would help the economy to recover. 9 
The second incenitve was one for the British. NacDonald 
wished to go to the United States to illeet Hoover. Stimson, 
through Dawes , made it clear to MacDonald that any such visit 
would be conditional on the success of the preliminary discusions 
) 1" , 10 on nava~ imitation. 
The finaL push to the movement to obtain an agreement on 
warships was t he fact that the Washington Conference's Five Power 
treaty required a new conference in lY31 to consider and enact 
any changes In the treaty made necessary by technological 
developments. Th is conference was the Chance to try to do wha~ 
the Gen~va Con ference had tried, 
classes of wa~sn iPs !( 
to restrict the nonrestricted 
The infc =2 al conversations between Dawes and MacDonald weht 
well . MacDona~d said that the Admiralty would be much more 
cooperative t h is time than at Geneva. The Amer i cans and the 
British agre2d that t he naval officers would not dominate the 
f utu r e confernece as they had done at Geneva. 
In the ~nlted States , rloover and Stimson asked t he General 
b 
Boar d for a ' yardstick' with which to compare the nava l streng th s 
of the Five Power signatories. ~he Board replied that a 
yar d stick was impossible. According to the Board, ships could 
not be compared across classes as their functions were different, 
and thus their armor, armament, speed , etc. were different. 
Fina lly , Ad miral Jones , a delegate at Geneva, declared that even 
if the United States and Great Britain had perfect equality in 
Ships the Uni ted States would be at a disadvantage because the 
british had extensive bases and a larger merchant marine , both of 
whi c h would make .dritain superior in sea power. In the opinion 




Finally , after fruitless argument with the General 
United S t ates and Great Britain 
method of measuring naval strength./~ 
abandoned the 
The problems confonting Dawes and MacDonald were t he Same as 
t hose wa ich nad faced the delegates at Geneva. The problem was in 
the number cf heavy and light cruisers due the United States and 
Great britain. The United States wanted many a-inch-gun 10,000 
ton cruisers a~d Great Britain desired many smaller , 6-inch-gun 
cruisers. 
After deliberation throughout the summer of 1929 , the ~ 
United States and Great Britain agreed to a preliminary 
understanding o~ naval limitaion . ~ne basic agreement was that 
the Uni ted S ~ates and Great Britain were to enjoy parity with 
each other ; t o ~each that parity in 1936 ; to extend the holiday 
on capi tal ship construction; to allow Great Britain 
approximately 33 9,000 tons of cruisers , with mor e of its tonnage 
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in light cr ui sers than the United ~tatesi and to al~ow the United 
States approximately 300,000 tons of cruisers, with more of its 
tonnage in heavy cruisers than the British. Although some 
differences on the number of cruisers existea between the United 
btates and Great JJritain it was no more than a matter of approxi-
mately 2U,000 tons. Both nations decided that they could sol~e 
these problems at the conference!] 
AS a result of this naval settlement, the United States 
invited MacDonald to vlsit Hoover in late September 1929, and the 
br i tish gever mnen t sent inv ita tions to the 1" i ve-Power treaty 
signatories for a conference to be held in London starting in 
January of l~30. The nations Whon the Americans and British 
invited -France, Italy and Japan - accepted their invitaions. 
~ne preliminary conversations between the United States and Great 
britain had resolved most of the problems which had ruined the 
Geneva Conference of 1927. 
solve the res::.IY 
It appeared that the Conference woul~ 
In 1~27 , France and Italy had refused to participate in the 
Geneva Confe=snce. In 1929 they accepted the British invitation 
to a simiiar co~ference in London. What caused these nations to 
change in the years after Geneva? Their main reason for rejecting 
their ivitat18DS in 1927 was that a conference of the leading 
naval powers would undermine the activities of League sponsored 
attempts to ~i~it armaments. Since then the League ' s preliminary 
conference on ~i sarmarnent haa come to a standstill. 
In i~26 , 1n an effort to obtain some agreement on 
Clsarmament toe ~rench and British governments had signed a 
protocol accepting certain groundrules for land and naval" 
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uisarmament. The French accepted the Britisn position on naval 
arms and the dritish the French position on land armaments. This 
exacerbated the situation because the United ~tates took offense 
at the parts of the agreement pertaining to naval limitation as 
the restricted categories covered most Uniteo ~tates auxiliaries, 
and the non-:-restricted categories covered most British 
auxiliaries. Because the United ~tates - a major naval power, 
and potentially the naval power - obj ected to the E'ranco-rlr i tish 
agreement, trie Frencri and British quietly shelved the proposal. 
r.;-
In 192~, woile the Anglo-american converstaions succeeded in 
overcoming tne problems of the Geneva Conference of 1927, the 
League's Disarmament Commission continued to st~gnate. Fina.Lly, 
the League gave its blessing to the conference of the five major 
naval powers, believing that if the great powers could reach an 
agreement on naval matters then it. might be possible to re-start 
the League's Disarmament Commission!? Thus, the French and the 
Italians had ~o reason for saying that a conference of the five 
powers would disrupt League activities, for the League could not 
accompl ish 'n'h3 t the conference ~vould attempt I and the League had 
admitted its fa~lure. Thus, all of the nations attending the 
London Con£ere~ce Knew that this conference was the last good 
chance to achieve substantial reduction in arms , and perhaps to -
re-start the Deag~e talks. 
Crih .t:"l'.t:,.r{ 'll J.. 
·.i.'he Lonoon .:~ava.L Cu[lterence: 1.:)3 0 
I t d Cl t ls h ana hmerlcan plans workee, tne Lonuoo Nava~ 
Conference of l~3 0 WOULd be different froln the ill-fated Geneva 
~aval Conference of ~~27i It wouLa be a success. 'l' tle rliTter lCdn 
and ~ritish gover nments had concludea that the major reason for 
the failu£e of the Geneva Conference was that the delegations of 
their nations were dominated by naval officers. 'i'nerefore I the 
Hoover administration deClde~ that its delegation would be a 
civilian one, dedicated to reaching a SOlution, wlthout becoming 
preoccup lea by technical detallS. ~he MacDondld government in 
1.. 
tir i tain tlad reached the saine conclusions. 
l'ne head ot t ile hiller ican de.Legation was Secretary at ~tate 
.:i tLnSOr1. :itiwson, an avowed rtnYlophile, committed himself to a 
new naval llmitatlon treaty . but for .::;timson, a new treaty was 
onlY a Hledns to an end. His goal was to reverse the recent 
negatlve c.r l1: t In hnglo-American re.Lations. .:itimson selected an 
admi rable Slate of assistants. These CO-delegates incJ..uded 
l-I.lIlDaSSaC1or Cha.r ..Les Umves, who had negotiated the prelimlnary 
agreements with MacDonald; Hugh Gibson, Ambassador to Belgium, 
the heac c~ tae hillerican delegation to the League Commlssion on 
Disarmament ana tne ilead of the AmerIcan delegation to the Geneva 
~aval Conference of 1~27i and Uw ight Morrow, Ambassador to 
~\'leXlco. 0tnar deLegates included Cnarles Adams, Secretary of the 
l.'lavy i 
the de.Leg a ~e .3 
vosep11 Kooinson; and Senator Llav idrteed. L'lione of 
·were naval officers; most ot tilem were AnglOPhi.Les?--
i-lOS t,,:n:: tne Amer ican tecbn lcal adv i::;er s wer e naval. of f lcer s 
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wnom ~he government thoug il t wou~~ give a fdi r~y un0 i ase0 vi ew o t 
th e s ta tus at LIt? wor ld I S nav ies. i-\.Qilllral IhlJ..lam V. i?ratt, the 
COinmanc:ier - In-Cn ief Unlteu .states .Fl.e~t, the n igbest ranklllg sea 
'doing officer, headed the se aavisers. Hoover and .stimsun had 
chosen Pratt because he was a rare naval offlcer, one '~1110 could 
see the advantag es to be gained from an agreement wlth the other 
four naval power s . RJ..SO, Pratt, was an Anglophil e and fIt In 
J' 
well. with the civilIan delegation. 
~he BrItlsh delegation was also composed of civilians. The 
head of tne british delegation was the Prime Minister, MacDonald. 
HI S suborciinate co-delegates included t\rUlUr henderson, ,sceretary 
of .state for Forelgn Affairs; and AJ..bert Alexander, the First 
- , ~ 
Lord ot the Adlnlralty. 
And r e ',i'arc.i leu , the neau of tne Frencn government, and 
Ari s tide briana, the foreign fuini s ter of WaShington Conferen6e 
ana Pa r i s Peace Fact fame, J..ed the FrenCh deJ..egation, wh lch \Vas 
alSO all-Clvi~ian. Other delegations did no t follow the British 
sU992s~ion ..:::i aLL civilian delegations. '.1,'ne Italian and Japanese 
del.egation.3f1ere a cOinbination of civilians and naval officers-:--
'.L'ne B.:19 J..o-A:ner lcan d lSCUSS ions had cleared away the problems 
blocked an agreement at Geneva, but there were 
other cl:i::ie::::---::I:ces among the five nations Wi1lCl.1 the conversatIons 
had not SC-l;l2C . The French, Italian and ~apanese positions all 
had the ?O~en~la~ of ruinlng the London Conference. 
Th e 2re:1c~ position presented two posible major conflicts 
and one S~d_~er one. ~he French government was strongly opposed 
to grant.:.n.g l.t.aly parity w·ith France. 'l'hi s clashed with the 
Italian PGS 1 ~lOn, wh ich aimea for parlty with France. 'I'he 
Ita.LlanS ad wl tted tile 1"L"encl1 cla:ulls that tV/O coa s t ..LIneS ana 
dependence on (\jor til fit r lcan C01.011 ies requ 1 red . the Prencn to 
protect tilelr sea lanes. nut tne italians said that tbeir 
situation was no different froffi the ~rench's . 'i'be 1 ta 1.i ans 
depenueu on theIr sealanes at -,-east as mUCll as 
almost al.L food for Italy arrived by sea. ALSO, the I t alians had 
the ir i-ior tb C1fr iean col6nies. AS ti1e 11: fInal. pOln t, the 1 talians 
pointed out that French allIes and territories surrounded Italy's 
long coastline. both the French and the ItaLIans seemed to have 
good reasons for tneir positions, yet these were a potential 
source of trouble for toe conference. vf all the conflIcts 
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r a i s ed by the French position,this was the most serious. 
~he second problem WdS the ~rench demand for protection of 
I ts I secur i ty I • French post-war govrenments had always sought 
agreements protecting France's securIty, 'with tne United States 
as the major guarantor. ~hi s had happened at the Washington 
Confereii·:;e and ,..,ould hal?pen again at London. 'rile United States 
governmenc had always opposed such agreements, and the rloover 
aaministratlon held to this posi~ion . 
Final.J..j , ~he French government reiterated its belief that 
tnere was ~n extreme interdependence oetween naval, l~nd, and air 
armament-s. 'i.'herefore, the French insisted that any agreement 
',-;hlCi1 Ule nacions comp.l.eteu at London was subjec t to the approval 
of the Le~g~ 2 's Permanent Preparatory Commi s ion on Disarmament.7 
:L'ne -.)2.~' a.t;ese also presented a problem tor the conference. 
In pre~iifilnary convers a tions the Japanese government iniormed the 
Br 1 tlsl1 area diner icanleaders tilat Japan would not accept the 
3 
ratio of 5:5:3 (UnI ted ~tdtes , Grea t uritain, Japan) whicn it had 
accepted at ~ashington. in iace , tne J apanese deLegatIon couLd 
nut accpet a ratIo LOy~er tha,l -LU :1.U:7 in crUIsers and other 
auxiLIaries . ? 
B.tter makIng their v iews ~ nown ~n pre~lm l nari talks , the 
aelegations aerivea at Lonaon for the Conference. 'i'he Br i tish 
Kin'] , George V, opened tile London {'l aval. Conference by adressing 
the delegates on the benefits of peace and reduction of arms. 
B.tter the KIng ' s speech the ae~egates selected MacDonaLd as the 
Cnairman of the Conference. ~hen all five chief delegates made 
speecnes statIng the rela t Ive nava-L requirements ot their 
nations. ~here was no 'show stopping ' speech such as that wilicn 
secretary hughes gave at WaShington in 1~2 l. ~he conference then 
recessed .9 
Atter tne openIng meeting , eacn de~ega t l0n ref ined I ts 
prepared position. ~he Unl~ed States' delegates asked their 
naVd-L adv lser s for more i n for Hla tion on tne d 1 t terence betvleen the 
cruiser and the six-inch-gun cruiser. 'l'he 
aaVlsers w~re dIVIded as to wnich was the better Shlp. 
them InC~UGlng Admiral Pratt, beLieved that tne six-inch-gun was 
better as Its rate of fire was faster than that of the eignt-
inch-gun. ~he six-inch-gun had the additIonal advantage of 
a~~owing more guns to be p~acea on a slng~e Ship than the eight-
incn-gun. since six-inch-guns were Lighter, ships whiCh 
carried cne~ cC~Ld have increased armor. B. minority of the navaL 
advisers ravorea t he eight-inch-gun because it had a greater 
IcJ 
range. 
Aiter l l s~e n ing to the advice of the experts , the B.merican 
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delegation OeCloeu to InsI s t on elYllteen e ight - incn-g un cru i sers 
and an aduitiuna~ number oi six-incn-gun crui se r s . 11 
• 
'l'ne re;ncunoer of the AHler ican proposal. askeo for a 
continuation of the holiday in capita! Sh lP construction througn 
l~jo . Al.50 l it asked ti1e five power 5 to C[lange the terms of the 
Washington treaty so that the battleshIp fleets of the Un Ited 
~ta tes I G.cea t tlr i talfl, and Japan woul.d teach their findl levels 
in lY36 not in 1942 . In addition , the Unlted States propositlon 
ca ~ led for a ratio - though not exp~iclt - of 5:5:3 (Uni ted 
~tates , Great dritain , Japan) for destroyers, the United States 
to have iJu,UOO tons. ~he proposaL al.so suggested a ratio for 
s ubmarines of 6:6:4 (same as above ), with the United States to 
have 60,0UO tons. ~here were two other categories in the Un ited 
btates p~an , dircraft carriers and exempt vessel.s. Hircraft 
carrIer s wOUl.d no l.onger nave a lower tonnage limit of 10 ,000 
tons - a l l. carriers would fa ll into this category, and would be 
charged against thelr owner s ' tota ~ carrler tonnag e . 'l'ne f Ina! 
Cl.ass dea ..... t VI i tn exempt sh ips, and the characteri s tics of th is 
type were spelleo out In detai l so ~s to prevent any ~oopho~e~ in 
I " 
tne treat::;'. ' ~ 
Tne ce~Egatlon sent a copy of the American position to 
Boover for his approval, whiCh he g r anted . It then made the plan 
pub~ic . P~ess response to the plan was generally favorable. 
Congressi0na~ response was also favorable, although some Key 
members GlQ not l ike the proposal. ~he other deLegations 
cautiosly r2sponded that they woul.d examine th e American proposal 
,_ . . , 13 
be tore ma.": Ing COULl ter -proposaLs . 
5 
'l'ne l5rlti s h ~vere tile f i rs t to re p l.y to the i-I.lllerlccHl 
proposal. bince tile Aloer iean plan '.id S essen t iall..1 tne Sdwe as 
that wil ie n t h e two natIons oiscussea in prelIminary talk s , the 
l5ritish pl.an tenaed to fOllow the outline of the fimerican one • 
.tn addItion, the Britisn rey:uested a reduction ill tne SIze of 
f u ture battleshIps. rlllother c.i I t ter ence between the h.mer ican and 
drltish plans wa s tile Brltish ca..Ll for the abolition of 
submarines . ~h is part of the proposal was identi ca l 
9~/JeVd '" }?V 
advanced at Washinqton in l~21 
WIth one the 
l/f 
rir 1 tlsh had - ,t. 
~ne French were next to respond. j:'irst , they stated their 
baSIC prinCIples. ~he ~rench said , a s they had a t Washington, 
that theIr navy was a defensive one only . AS a defensive navy 
the ~rench needed approx imately l~i ,lOU tons of submarines and 
39 U,000 tons of aux i liari es . Also, the French believed that the 
oe s t way of t r e a ting the problem of naval l.imitation was to 
allocate total fleet tonnages and total category tonnages to each 
nation, a~Lowlng each nation to shift some of its total tonnage 
between c a tegories. Last, the French govern~ent continued to try 




Tn e J ap a nese continued to press for at least a lU:lO:7 ratio 
in all claS3es. The Japanese navy had pressured it~ government 
co acc 2pL t n is pos i tion. ~he Japanese pOSition appeared to be 
t l.rm, slnce the government had won a general e lectIon during 
J:' i r.al. .l. Y, tnere was the c a se ot the Italian de l egatIon. The 
Italians appear e d to be sitting on the s idelines, waiting to see 
wha t t h e i 'r2 ;lc ,,1 d id and what was done to the IU. AS stated before , 
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th e ItaLIans '",anted parity WIt!l tile .i'rench , anu WOULd accept 
t ··· /7 no nlny out parIty . 
After al L the delegations replied to the Amer icon plan , ti1e 
.hiller ican delegates evaluated tne otj:-ler proposal.S to see ~Jhat 
ctlance the conference had of succeedIng . it appeared to the 
Amer ican delegation that a se ttlement with the ~rencn would be 
difficult , if not i mppossible, to achieve . ~he Frenco tonnage 
demands were too high tor the British to accept. if the .French 
navy won the tonnag e that it wanted and i talIans oad parity WIth 
France , the British could not illaintain their dominanc~ in Burope. 
~o the BrItIsh this outcome was unacceptable. ~he Un ited States 
cou ld not accept the French proposal as it WOULd indirectly raise 
i'\rner lcan tonnage requirements OJ raISIng Britain's. 
Additionally, the Uni ted States government refused to assent to a 
~rench reque s t for a security agreement to enforce the Paris 
, _. 11' 
.P eace r'act. 
~ne J a~anese proposal. alSO presented a problem for the 
United S tate.s . I t i t were accepted, the United States wold not 
nave enoug~ tonnage to definitelY enforce its will in Asia. If " 
the United Qtates war~ed with Japan, the Japanese would have a 
fIghting ,c;:a:1ce to hold off the American navy - for a wh ile. 
'l'hus, on tne one hand, if the United States agreed to the 
J apanese ;?.l.an the United States WaUl-a give up its aolity to 
intervene slg n ii icantly in Asian affairs . On the other hand, if 
the Unltea 6tates did not agree io the ~apanese plan, then the 
Unityed ~ta tes would have to increase its navy to a l evel which 
would alLOW Eor deCIsive intervention in Asian attalr s a course 
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WillCh ca .iied tor vas t, un~o2u ~ ar , expenditures. If the American s 
Chose the l a t ter po licy t rlen they ',WU .id con f llc t wi tn the 
~apanese and tnere WOU.id be no agr e ement wltn the Japanese at the 
London Conference 19 
~ne Conference was stalemated. ~ne ~rench and Japanes e 
positions tlad placed the United States in a position which did 
not a.i.iOW an agreeemnet. Both the French and Japane se refused to 
chang e the i r plans. In order to save something from the 
Conference Stimson announced that he was willing to s ign a 
bilateraL treaty on auxiliary ships with Bri ta in. 'l°h is treaty 
would be better than nothing. At l. e a st it ,vou.ld heal Anglo-
~O 
American relatIons. 
'l'hen Cai!12 a surpri se for .st imson; the J apa nese f ina.tly 
a greed to compomi se. ~he Japane se did not want so much to 
comproml se as to avoid appearing the villains of theconterence. 
~he Japanese government ' s deci s ion to compromise was directly 
opposed to t h e wi s he s of the navy, but it decided that a tr ea ty 
d-., 
wa s worth the troub.ie which th e navy would cause. 
by t he end of March, the conference had r~sumed its 
progress . ~he French made one last push for a security treaty 
wito e lt.t.er tne 3rItisn or Americans. ~his atternp~ met with 
defeat. ':: 0 J..lg h t of that failure the :French refused- · to Lindt 
auxi .iiar j vesse l s . ~he Ita~lans fOl~owed the ~rench and sa id 
that they would build to French leve~s - whatever those levels 
would be. ~he f i na.i form of agreement was becoming clear to the 
delegates . new treaty WOU.id principaly affect the Uni ted 
b ta tes I Gre~ t britain , and Japan . The French and Italians wou.id 
not sig n any ?art of the treaty wh ich changed their status a s 
8 
de fined by the ',"ash ing ton trea ty?-J-
l" inallj, on the 22nd of Apr 11 ti1 e deleljates sIgned t ile 
treaty - wIt h reservatIons. ~he treaty dealt witn capital an~ 
non-capitaL ships. It also haa a protocol. J:{egarding the 
categories limIted by the Washington treaty, the United ~tates, 
Great Britain, and Japan agreed to reduce their capital ships by 
a total of nine ships, thus producing the final Washington ratio 
among theIr battle fleets that originally would hav e been reached 
in 1942. (Some of tnese ships WOUld be scrapped, others 
converted to train ing and target ships. ) Additionally, the three 
nations agreed to a continuation of the holiday on capital ShIP 
construction for another five years . Last, the nations agreed to 
a new definition of aircraft carriers. All aircraft carriers 
WOU Ld be cou n ted under a nation ' s total tonnage allocation. 
Also, no carrIer was to be bUllt weIghing under 10 ,000 tons . 
~revlously , carriers COULd have been any si ze up to 27 ,000 tons . 
All. of the delegations agreed to these artIc les - France ~nd 
I ta l Y inC l ~Ged~ 
Tne n e xt dlvislon of the treaty dealt with classes not 
llmited at ~a sh lngton. Tne French and italians Old not sign this 
par t of "CZ12 teea t v . 'ilhe Un ited btates and Great Britain would 
retain pa rl =j with each 
hIOr~ 
three ,;'ltJeav j Cj-in ch-gun) 
more Llght ( a - loch-gun) 
other. ~he United States 
-(hll\ r~e [l/" 'rl.r A 
cruisers, but the BritiSh .. ~ 
wo u l d have 
would have 
cr ui s e r s . Th e Japan ese would continue to 
have a =a tl u o f S:J (United States, Japan) with regard to heavy 
crUl se rs. i n t n e category ot Light cruisers the United States 
would ha v e a L J:7 ratio . 'llhe same r atio of 10: 7 I be tween the 
Un Ited States ana 0 apan , he l d for Jestcojers and submarInes. riy 
accepting thIS ratio the Uni tea bta t es llilli ted Japan to buiLa 
onLy 2 ,UUU mor e tons of lIght cruisers - not enough for one snIp 
- and forced J apan t o scrap destroye r s and submar I nes. 'I'hus the 
UnIted States forced tne Japanese to stanu still wh ile it could 
bUIld its own navy up to treatystrengtn. 
Ttie last ll1ajor part of the agreement, the protocoL, 
contained the escape clause and a requirement for another 
conference . ~he ' escape clause ' allowed any nation to increase 
its navy beyona treaty lImits if its national interests were 
threatened by the naval program of any non-signatory nation. If 
this clause was invoked, the other Signatories coula then 
proportionateLY increase their navies. rhis negated the etfect 
of .fr ance ' s anc.i 1 taly 's refusal to Sig n the par ts I ilni ting 
aux l liaries. ~he treaty WOUld expire i n l~3o , but it called for 
another conference In 1~35 to see what changes might neea to be 
made in i~ ae tna~ time. ~he reason that tne treaty ' s life was 
only five years was that MacDonald was uncertain of the world 
sItuation an~ ~rItish commltments , and wished to have the option 
D 
to cnange ~h~ treaty in the near future. 
An a~ree~2nt had been reached . ~he United ~tates and 
BritIsh gover~ments attained their goal of a rapprochement witn 
each otner ~~2 a limi ting of Japan's navy. The United States dId 
conceae some 0~ its aDiity to intervene in ASIan affairs , bu t the 
Hoover adIlniscration aid not see tnis as a loss since the 
traditiona~ pJLICY of the government nad been not to project 
illaJor military :?o'der In Asia. ~he Japanese government gained a 
~lttle mor2 security from the Uni ted States and Great brita In 
10 
d l tnougrl 11lernber s at ttie LJ apanese gover mnen t KneH tria t J af)<1Il coul.d 
not withstand a war with a determineu America. .oU t the trea tj 
had its enemIes . Many Bmerican and rlritis h naval. offIcers 
tnoug h t that it unduly restricted AmerIcan freedom of action. 
Most J apanese naval. officers felt the same way witn respect to 
Japan ' s freedom of action. ~inall.y , the French and Italians were 
dissatistied because theIr navalgoal.s had not been accepted by 
the other aelegations ~nd written into the treaty. ~he treaty 
was not perfect; it has a fair compromise. but the grounds for 
comproillise were shifting. The national. interests of the naval 
natIons were changing , as they al.ways did , but previously the 
cha nges had allowed a compromIse , althougn the French and 
ltal.ians haa drifted far enough from the other nations to prevent 
an agreement with them. Whether f utu re shifts In national. 
in terests h'OU1.0 al.low a compromise in 1:.135 I 
another matter. 
11 
In five years, was 
CctAP~~H VIII 
~he ~nd of Llmitation 
In l~30 the United States,Great Britai n and Japan ratified 
the LondOn ~aval treaty of 1~3U, a successor treaty to the ' 
Washington Conference's Five-Power t reaty. ~hese treaties were 
designed to reduce naval armament and therefore reduce the 
chances of war among the powers~ Hoth of these treaties called 
for a new naval conference in 1935. Unless it was extended at the 
next conference, the London treaty would expire at the end of 
The Washington treaty would only expire two years after 
one of the signatories denounced the treaty, otherwise it would 
last indefinitely. 
In the five years before l~35 the world situation changed 
raaically. By l~3S it was cLear to the government of the Unlted 
States that a ne w navaL agreement would be next to imposssible to 
achieve. ~he change in the status-quo was the result of two 
major sets of events combining to reduce the sense of security 
whicn post war agreements, such as the naval limitation treaties, 
had created among most of the major powers. ~he first group of 
factors In che collapse of the sense of world security were the 
increasing severity of the Great Depression and the actions 
governme~t5 too k to alleviate their nations' suffering. The 
secona set of events was the rising militarism of two nations 
Japan and Ge:3any . 
~he Grea~ Depression haa a terrible effect on the economy of 
th e Uniteo btates. ~he common man could see the damage it had 
done . ~he nat ion experienced unprecidented unemployment and 
1 
bu~iness fai lure. Adding to the misery o f i nau stria l failures 
ttie nation I s farmers suffered as a severe drought .ruIned many 
farms and sent the farmers packing . Something needed to be done 
- oy someone. 
Initially, the Federal government responded to the 
uepreSSlon by treating it a s a temporary, short term, aberation 
In the economy. cloover believed that if the government cut its 
buaget, and therefore taxes, tnen the nation wouLd have a greater 
Qlsposable income. 'I'his greater amount of money would in turn be 
used by the PUblic to buy good s . In turn this increase in 
consumption would restart the nation ' s industry, and the 
Depression would oe over. Hooover did not believe that the 
federal government should sponsor work projects as relief for the 
unempLoyed. Instead he thought that private charity should 
handle relif to those workers without jobs. 
2.... 
The Deppression also effected the United States navy. After 
the Londo~ C~nferencec the C~O and the ~ecretary of the Navy and 
other na ';al leaders told ti1e na'vy's officers that the London 
treaty so+- guidelines toward which the navy would be built. 
However, this pro:nise was not kept. Instead, Hoover' s Bureau of 
the Budget askea the navy to cut the shore establish~ent and, 
more impc:~antly, the number of ships afloat. The officers did-
not r ece iV e tnis new s well. ~o many it seeemed to confi rm their 
belief that t~2 civilians had sold-out the navy. Th e Chief of 
i\)aval Opera~icr:s , Admiral Pratt, was also scorned by many in the 
navy. ~he navy had been ordered to cut its budget by 
$3 U,OOO,OOO. Pra~t tried to follow these orders, to this end 
~ratt sugg€sted a rotating reserve , with one-t h ird of the fleet 
2 
lai d u2 in r ese r ve. ~nis d id not help h is reputation within the 
navy, a s he WJ S disllked because had been the leading officer at 
the London conference and had been one of thos e who had promi s ed 
atreaty navy. It d id not appear likeLY that the United ~tates 
navy would reach treaty strength any time soon. Japan and 
urita in, on the other hand, were at treaty strength. The Uni ted 
':l.. 
States navy was at a d i sadvantage . 
The do~e s tic reaction to tne Depres~ion in the United States 
affected foreign affairs. One Congressional response to the 
tragedy o t the uepr ess ion was to pass the highest tarif~ in the 
nation' s hi story - Smoot-Hawley. This tariff forced many nations 
out of Un i ted States marKets . This law tried to help Ame~ican 
business by protecting it from foreign competition. However , 
th i s trade barrier indirectly hu rt the Uni ted States. By 
bloc%i ng acce ss to United State s markets , Smoot-Hawley reduced 
t he d o lla c re se rves of foreign nations . Many of these nations 
needed tc ~ ~y goods from the United States , yet they were running 
out of d0~~~rs to pay for their purchases . Since they found it 
harder to se ~l g oods i n the United States , they were unable to 
ear n tne c ~ ~cenci they needed to obtain goods from the United 
$I 
States . l't:JS , t i1ey aisliked tne new tariff. 
'l'o c.:)r;.;?l. ::cate f i nancial matters , most .i:,;uropean nat i ons owed 
the Un i ted ~ ~3t2S money for loans t~ken during and after the war. 
Most of t hese nations paid their loans by using the monies paid 
to them 01 ~ e ;::~a !l Y as war reparations. Germany, in its turn, 
obtained lts ~~l ted States currency by way of loans from American 
bank s . ~~ 1 5 ~ouse of cards tumbled d own when Germany's economy , 
3 
suffer ing from the Depression, began to co~lapse. If Germany 
cOllapsed then the reparations and loans 'Nould not be paid and 
many American banks would close and most European govern~nets 
',.iOi.ll.O default. ~hus, everyone owed the United States money, yet 
the United States did not let anyone earn the currency they 
needed. The problem inherent in this situation was obvious to 
the United States government, but it insisted 6n repayment of the 
loans. Nevrtheless, the European nations did not have the money.¥ 
At first the United States did nothing to help the Europeans 
with their payments. But in ~une of 1931, Hoover realised that 
something needed to be done. He suggestea to his advisors a plan 
for a one-year moratorium on all intergovernmental payments c to 
~he United States. All. of them agreed that a moratorium was 
need'2d. Hoover announced the moratorium on June 21, 1931. 'The 
next two wee~3 were busy ones for the Hoover administration. The 
various m'2il~erS of the admini s tr ation negotiated the details with 
the Frenc~r ~~glish, and Germans. Finally, on July 6th an 
agreement was r2&ched. But even this moratorium only served to 
slow the Ge~nan economy's collapse. It was only with massive 
foreign lC&'--;'5 , jan~ closings, and the intervention of the German 
government tjat t h e German economy was able to survive the years 
befor e h:':~2: . fhere were other remedies, such as a freeze on 
private de,;)ts , ~n lch the Europeans and Americans applied to save 
the world ' s 2ccno2Y. All of the 'fixes' were only marginally 
successf ul : a~Q did not cure the illness . 5 
P:otec~i0~ is~ wa s not isolated to the United States. The 
British LS?l r e also practicea it. ~he 8ritish gave preferential 
4 
tr2~tment to domInions and terr i tories fi rst. ~hil e it was easy 
for ftlemeber s of the Commonweal th to tr ade with eaCh 0 ther , it 
wsa s tougher for outsiders to cross the barriers erected against 
the,n. AS tbe decade wore all, ana after Hitler had taken power , 
the Germans would also turn to protectionism. The Japanese were 
no different, 'they too engagea in protectionism throughout the 
1.0305. Th is economic Isolation of the world ' s nations wasa 
contrary to reality. As all of them had recognized in the 1920s, 
they were inextricably tied to each other financiallly, 
pOLiticaLly and militarily. While the nations tried to protect 
themselve s fro~ economic rea lity, it still affected their 
7 
actions . 
~he world was in dire financial straits. Add i ng to the 
troubles c&used by the depression, Japan and Gerlnany increasingly 
became militaristic nations. In Japan, one of the first events 
WDICb signa l~ed the shift toward extreme mili tarism was the 
Manchurian Crisis. In September of 1931 the Japanese Kwantung 
Army faXed a Chinese attempt to sabotage the South Manchuria 
rtailroad. This ',,'as a Japanese owned railr:oad in Hanchuria. 'fhe 
troops were there to protect the concession. Using this pretext 
the Japanese ar~y tnen proceeded to occupy all of Manchuria. 
Thi s directly c on travened many treaties and agreements to which 
Japan was party . The treaties included the ~ine-Power treaty 
form the Wasnlns~cn Conference , the Paris Peace Pact, and the 
Covenent of t be ~eas~e. The latter two prohibited agression, the 
first pledg ed Japan to 'respect' the territorial integrity of 
China . Of all these , the Covenent of the League provided the best 
5 
ii1 2ans of enforc ins itself . 'l'ne Leaug e c ouLd apply sanction s and 
e ve n enforce an eillbargo against a nation wh ich violated the 
.~ . t l.-0Venen c. 
Initially , ~timson let the Leagu e ~ead the response to the 
Manchurian incident. In the early parts of the crisis, Stimson 
believed that the United States should alLow the Japanese 
cIvilian governHlent the tiille to regain control of its colonial 
arwy. 'rhus, Stimson endorsed a Leagueresoultion for Japan to 
evacuate the captured t erritory, but unlike the League Stimson 
aid not give a time l imit. On October 8th the Japanes e a ir force 
bombed the city of Chinchow , far from the South Manchurian 
1{ailroao. Still:SOn began to believe that the Japanese were 
fignting a war of aggression. Stimson ' s attitude changed because 
of Chinchow. he b e gan taking a hard line against the Japanese. 
TIle League bad establi s hed the Lytton Commission to investigate 
tne situation in ~anch uria. Stimson had asked for and received 
a n Ameerican s~at on the commission. Stimson was drifting toward 
more co-ope~a~lon ~ith tne League. The United States even sa t at 
the CounciL o f the League of Nations , but only on the Manchurian 
r,. 
d · . ' I ISCUSS l on s . 
On De8e~jer ~ith the moderate Japanese government f~ll; in 
its place was a 2i ll tar isti c one wn ich would back the army. On 
January 2 1 
- ~. ' ... 
...L':;..J~ ~ [1 e J apanese took Chinchow. That was the end of 
Stimson's 
. . . :uoc.er a t !on. Stimson began to lead the Leauge, not 
fOllow l t . On Jan uary 7th Stimson sent a stern note to the 
J apanese. b ci ~son ' sattitude toward Japan changed. According 
the Un ited States r e f used to recognize the 
r e sult of a n i a c tions which violated Uni ted States ' treaty 
b 
privileges 1n ~anchuria and Ch1na. ~hi s was the Stimson 
Doct:I"lne, which str es s e d nonr e c09nition of the new status-quo in 
Ivlancl1ur- i a . .2rivate.lY, Stimson fe.lt that the League and the 
Unit:ed States should impose sanctions against Japan. After 
Stimson promulg a ted ~i s policy of nonrecognition, he waited for 
the other world powers to join hi s position. Unfortunately for 
btimson, none o f them joined. In fact, the British and French 
governments seemed to side with the Japanese. The United States 
now lead the world in criticizing the Japanese. And it was the 
United States which 
I' . . . to received most of Japan s III wl~l. 
At the end o f January, the Japanese began to move against 
the Chinese in and around Shanghai. At this point Stimson became 
belLicose. It wa s almos t as if the Japanese had done thi s to 
spite Stimson and his policy of nonrecognition. Stimson urged 
that American troops and ships be sent to Shanghai. but Hoover 
disagreed with ::he reasons Stimson vlanted troops. stimson wanted 
the American ~~rces to join the British and deter the Japanese -
enforce intern2~i0~a~ law. Hoover wanted the troops in Shanghai 
so tha t they could protect Ame~ican lives and property, a 
traditional ~i ss: ~n. Hoover insisted that the United Sta tes had 
no interes::s in Asia whi ch were worth involving the United States 
II 
in a potenti~~L~Y expLosive situation. The Japanese had not 
heeded Stimson's notes . Stimson needed a ~vay to tluea ten the 
Japanese wi tLou;: " . r S2.Ylng it to them. In late February 1932, 
stimson wrote an open letter to Senator Borah , saying that the 
United States ~i;~t abrogate the Washington treaties if Japan 
continued f igh t i ng. Thu s, Stimson threatened Japan with a naval 
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!:-'::"::e , and possibly 'tIar. Also, ;:;timson left the Japanese guessing 
fA 
a3 to whether ttle United States wou.ld use sanctions. 'l'he truth 
~as that Hoover had already decided that the United States would 
not apply sanctions against Japan. :Finally, at the end of 
ieoruary the Stimson Doctrine received acceptance from other 
)owers. The League of Nations adopted the policy of 
. . . t I J . 'h 'h TT' t d . t t . nonrecognItIon as 1 s own. ~ us, ~ e unl e ;:; a es was no ~onger 
seperatedfrom trle League. Now A~erica initIated action which the 
~eague folLowed. Unfortunately, the Stimson Doctrine did not 
deter the Japanese. Insteaa, the Japanese withdrew from the 
l..JeaCjue of Nation.:; and finished the ir conques t of lvlanchur ia. 'J'he 
Japanese government had been changed by the Manchuria incident. 
Prio::: to it the government had been a fairly moderate one. After 
;'lancbur ia , U!E government was under more military control, a 
control which wouLd grow throughout the 1930s. 
Durins the ~i30s, in the Japanese navy, the moderates lost 
:3 r o i..lnd. Ins t23.::: a group knol,vn as the 'command group ' seized 
~hey ?~=ged senior moderate officers and arranged for the 
a?~ointillent of a ~eaK navy minister. By 1935 the 'command group' 
controlled Lne navy. ~wo of the basic principles of this group 
were that Japan ::o~~d win a war against the United States, and 
to do so it on~: neejed a ratio of 10:10:7. 'rhe 'command group 
felt that if l~ ~ad ? arity , Japan would quickly win a war. 'l'his 
li~e the Genera l Board of the American navy , 
~Elived that war 0et~een the two nations was inevitable. Many 
Japanese ofEice~ s t~ought that the Americans would lose their 
WiLl to fight a £=er one ~ajor defeat . ~he off i cers believed toat 
rlmericans were i..::ferior to Japanese and did not have the morale 
and s trength t o pr o secute a wa r . '1'11 U soy 1 ~ 3 S , the navy was 
controlled by men who wanted Japan to leave the Washington treay 
s y s tem and glrd for the /inevita!)le \var'" with the United States.''i 
The situation in Hurope also deteriorated. ~'ii th the 
appointment of Adolph Hitler as Chancellor of Germany in March 
1~33. By the end of l~33 Hitler had withdrawn Germany from the 
IS 
League and s tarted it on the path to war. 
In 1913 , Franklin U. Roosevelt (FDH) became President of the 
United States. His early foreign policy was a calm one. He 
continued the policies of working toward disarmament and co-
operating with other nations. But for FDK foreign policy took a 
back seat to domestic affair s . FUR' s tirst priority wwas to save 
the economy. To this end he tried to follow the Hoover policy of 
balancing the budget and cutting taxes. But he also began his 
own policy of government helping the unemployed and the poor. He 
started the ~ew Deal. Through hi s New Deal FDR hoped to provide 
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jobs for so~e of the unemployed and to keep prices staole. 
Fil~'S ~Lection was good for the navy. He had once been 
Assistant Secretary of the ~avy and tne Navy expected him to 
support the~r requests for ships. In Junel933, Cong ress passed 
an bill which ~o~~d provide jobs and help to build ships. '1'h is 
act was the ,";a tlonal Indus tr ial Recovery Ac t (NIRA). l"DR used 
the NIPA'S 2u~tority to· give the navy ~238 million for 
construction ~ -v ..... th i r ty ships including four cruisers, two 
aircraft carrie~si and twenty destroyers. The se were in addition 
to twenty-two SfilpS being built under other authorizations. 
Hoosevelt expected and received crIticism of this action from 
!?e2Ce groups . He said to h is Secretary of the Navy, Claude 
~wanson, "we got a\vay with murder that time." ~(italics mine)'" 
. R('P. (<J'-! 
I n l:::i34,' /\~ Vinson introduced a bill which authorized the 
~resident to build the navy to treaty strength by 1942. The 
result of this wasa the Vinson-~rammell Act of 1934. While this 
act only appr~~riated money for a few ships, it authorized the 
replacement of the fleet within the treaty limits. This was what 
the navy wanted. The United States began rearming. If all went 
17 
aas planned, the navy would be at the treaty level by 1~42. 
The administration promised the UnIted States navy that it 
would eventua.L.Lj be at treaty strength. However, the 
administration could not promise that the treaty system would 
last much longer. In fact it appeared that the treatIes for 
naval liillitalon would not be renewed. The League of Nations' 
Conference cn ~isarmament met in l~32-lY34. ~his conference 
fai l ed because of the shear nUmb~of differing opinions and 
,?ositions . ~~~ Fre~ch disagreed with the Germans, the French 
disagreed ~ith t~e Italians, the Japanese could not agree with 
the Amer i cans , etc . It was a hopeless stalemate. 
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left the League ~he Conference unofficially died. 
~'Vhen Germany 
The fi~al c nance to save the limitation_system was at the 
next naval c0~ fere~ce wh ich was schedled for lY35. Again the 
British were ~ je nosts. This conference was mandated by the 
Washington an~ ~o~aon treaties. FDR appOinted clorman Davis, 
formerly the head of the American ddelegation to the League ' s 
Disarmament Conference, as chief American delegate to the London 
Conference . the Aillerican, british, and ..Japanese 
deleyates bega~ ?~ elimlnary conversations in London. It quickly 
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became apparent to the participant s that an agreement was almost 
impossioJ..e. ~he Ameri cans were firm on their stand that Japan 
should not incr e ase its navy r a lative to the United ~tate s . ~he 
.Japanese, on tne other hand, had instructions to ask for 
complete parity. ~he British attempted to mediate between the 
. I? 
two nations. 
~ne British wanted an agreement which would protect the 
~mpir e in the ~ast. 'l'he governmnet had realized that the Royal 
~avy was not large enoug h to defend interests in the Atlantic, 
Mediterranean, and in Asia . Since the British worried more about 
the Germans, French and Italians , they deployedthe Royal navy in 
waters close to home. ~he British were ready to settle for a 
security agreement with Japan, but they did not want to aliena te 
the united States . J:lowever, the Japanese did not accept the 
.:3ritish offers , as they did not go far enough for the Japanese • 
by the end of 1.::d 4, tJ:le delegates were suggesting remedies to the 
stalemate ',.;h lC,.'. , a8cording to Davi s , "represented a tremendous 
come down f rom tje whole ~reaty s tructur e ." ~lowly the British 
20 
began to suppor~ t~e American stand. 
On Decerilbe r 2 ...:.. ( 1934 , the Japanese government abrogated the 
Washington trea~J. Both the British and American governmnet s 
expected this. . ~ 2ve;::e the less, it did dissapoint them . \vh ile, 
the naval conference bad not formally convened, it was appal"ent 
from J apanese ~e~ands in preliminary talks that the Washington 
?..{ 
and London treatIes would expire at the end of 1936. 
The ~econd ~ondon Naval Conference met in 1~35 . 'l'he 
conferees were t be U~ i ted States , Great Britain, Japan, .France , 
11 
ane Italy. it had the same s uc ess in ~ im iti ng t he t h ree largest 
naVies as the prel imi nary ta~k s had had - none. In January of 
~jjo , the Japan e se delegates withdrew, ~eavin9 observers.~~The 
conference did produce an agreement, but it was severly limited 
oy Japan ' s absence . The Second London Naval treaty required the 
signatories - the United ~tates, .Great rlritain, and France - to 
remain within qualltative guidelines in the make up of their 
fleets. But t h is new treaty was only a shadow of the earlier 
ones . It did not have any form of quantitative liwitation, the 
ratios of Washington and London. it had a very broad 
escape clause which allowed any power to build above treaty 
restriction s i f any other , non-tr ea ty- power ' s building 
tnreatened the s i gnatory ' s national interests. 'l'he di fference 
betwee n t h is treaty and the Japanese demand S was that the 
Japane se wa~ted parity with United btates, a parity enforced by 
treaty. ~~ i ~ treaty , even though it had broad limits , did not 
enforce pa ri ~y , s o the 
. /.-.] 
J apanese could not accpet It. 
Gr>2 3. t Britain , and the United States ra t ified the 
There were other efforts by these 
nations tc l i~i t naval arms . The British negotiated a bilateral 
agreement ~i th ~ermany in 19 35 . Wh ile this agreement was not a 
treaty, ffi ere~y a nexc hange of notes, it did provide a basi s for 
liillitatic~ j e t~een the two governments. The Germans agreed th~t 
they wouL d Jn~y buiLd up to a ratio of 100:35 (Great Britain , 
Gern:any ) . ~~i s ag~eement lasted until 19 3 d the Germans announced 
that tney ~o~~ j 0ui1d submarines up to the tonnage which the 
rlritish pos e s a ed . 3ut the British Admi ralty did not worry about 
thi s beca use ~ney t nought tha t advance s irlanti -su~marine warfare 
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nad re ndered the . subillarine obsolete . 1n April 193~ , Hitleer 
denounced the agreement, confirluing the fears of those i n Britain 
who distru s ted Hitler. ~he British made a s imilar agreement with 
the Soviet Union. ~his one lasted until the war started. Hut, 
tne se ag reements were ineffective , as they cou ld not limit the 
:LL( 
great naval powers nor prevent the German build up. 
after 1935 , the United States continued its naval expansion . 
I n 1936, it asked Great Britain and France to revi se the naval 
treaty to a~low battleships of 45,OUO tons, an increase of 10 , 000 
tons. 'l'hi s request was granted and the United b tates began to 
build its first battleships s ince the ~ashington Conference of 
1921.~~~hese battLeships were the fast battleships of World War 
11 whose mi s sion s were to protect and assist the air c raft 
carrler. ~he battleship was no long e r the backbone of the fleet . 
Th e .J a ,.?a li es e and Br i tish al.SO expanded the lr nav ies. The 
British c ':) :1 s;::- uc ted the King george y.. class battleships and the 
.J a?anese t:. 2 Ya.;:;a. to c l ass super-battleships. But it was in the 
~. 1-' Lle ..... o o f ~~ ~ ~r3£t carr i ers that the navies did 
?...6 
expanSIon. A ~ew naval race had begun. 
Worl~ ~ ar II started on September I, 1939, 
most of their 
On the Jrd , the 
British nC~lf i 2 j t he United States tha t they were suspending the 
London ~a~al treaty of 1~36. 
2.) 
ended. 
The e r a o f naval limitaion had 
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COnC1U:310n 
un Decem!.)er d, .1:;41., as a result at the Japanese raid on the 
krnerlcan fleet at Pearl clarbor, da~"lail , tne Un i ted S ta tes 
officia.1ly entered Wor.1d War li. ~ne Unitea statesf.1eet was not 
s~vere.1y damased by the Japanese raid. ~he United btates fleet 
at .l:'ear..L darbor consisted of ~6 major snips. Of those, onlY two 
were never salved. 'l'hey were the Utah, a target ship which the 
J"apanese TIll-stook for an active battleship, and the arizona which -----
suffered a laa~az 111e explode and was beyond recovery'!- "rhe rald 
damaged tne uapanese more thaIl the Americans beacuse it enraged 
the American public, and lumped the Japanese with the Germans as 
an 'evil' wnicb lfiUSt be ellminated. 
~ne Unltea States subsequently lost the battle for tne 
J!h ii" ipp i nes I but the Unlted btates Army ana Navy had predicted 
this s::'r.C2 . 1 ' "0 l. ear.1y ~L s. In seven months the United States 
win the battle of Midway, which signalled the 
turning ?c:~t in tne war with Japan. ~ven if the Unlted States 
had not won 2t ~idway, it would have won some later battle as the 
nation produ=e6 ~cre ships and planes. Japan was doomed to fight 
a holdins ac~iGn a~dultilliately to lose. 
" as:: In.:; ton sys tern tL"ea ties (those . slgned at the 
vva sill.ng tor~ 1 a~J ~ondon ~aval Conferences) have been ca.1led 'pipe 
dreams ' , a ?arc~ment peace and other disparaging terms. "i'hey 
have been caL~ed these by historians and naval officers. ~ost of 
toe oprO~~l ~~ ~ea?ed upon the treatles came i~nediately after 
~yorld Vvar ":: 1.. r~e official American N av~.1 history of Wor.1d War 
1 1, wrltcen bj ~amuel~. Morison, stated that the Washington 
1 
system treatIes had weaKened tile Un Ited ::>taces navy so that by 
l:'ear l tlar bor: i t ~',as not as e r tec ti ve i n conduc t ing the war a s It 
miyht have bee n if there had been no treaties. I t diso Implied 
that if there had not been dny treatIes, the Un ited States navy 
wou.i..d have oee n" large enougl1 so thd tit WOU.LQ have de tered the 
Japanese from attackIng. 'l'nus, the treaties were partially 
for the 'trageoy' of Pearl 
~ 
Harbor. ThIS extreme 
'navalists' VIew has been modified by other hi s torians. 'l'he 
mainstream realist - interpretation of the WaShington sy stem is 
that toey were hopelessly idealIstic; they did not account ide 
real.Itles and mirrored the 'naive' American inter-war 
'isolation'. ~he advocates of this position usually say that the 
League ot clations woul.d have oeen a better mecnanism for 
~romotlng world sec u r ity. Also, they claim tnat the absence of 
the United btates from the League crippled the League to sucn a 
great extent that it was unabl e to achieve Its goals of world 
peace . ~he ~ai nstream view also says that the Nasil ing ton 
t:.reaties cr::..?..:-'led toe United ::>tates freedom of action because" it 
()+ff/l 
diminished the navy. ~nus, the 'rea~ists'Aespouse a mllder form 
~ 
of Morison ' s VlEW.' 
'J.: ne ' rec.~!.sts ) ?lay down the fact that the "t.reaties 
provideu sec~clty to the siynator i e s for fifteen years. One 
example at t n :s security is the endIng of a potentially dangerou s 
and destao~iz~~g arms race in the early 1920s before the 
WaShington Con~2rence. I t is also pass iole tha t tlle 1 imi ta ion of 
the Japanese a~d hmerican navie s prevented a battle in 1~24; whell 
toe eXC~USlon act was Signed. If the navies had been larger 
2 
ti.0re wouJ..u nave Deen more cllance of contact and ti)US con:tlict. 
~Ilis reductIon in arms relnforced the international s ense of 
~ ec u rlty by dlsengaging the worldt laryendvles, and g i v ing thelll 
their own spneres of influence. Another Item in the treaties 
ravor i s tnat they were one of the few international agreements 
WhICh did produce a reduction in arms. ~he ~eague of ~ations 
never aell ieveo tna t goaL Again, the treatIes provide r e lief to 
the taxpayers ot th e s ignatory nations. Critics of the treatIes 
state that toe League was better at protectIng security than a 
rew 'scraps of pa2er. ~his was not the case. The treati es 
provIded add~tiooa~ security tor the signatorIes by assuring them 
toat the status-yuo would not be disturb~d fo~ the ~iie of the 
tce6!ties. CO:l12ar Ing tl'"li3 agains t ttle Lea ':Jue' s recora shows tha t 
tnis was better than the League could do. Also, criticisms that 
toe League was wounded bY , American rejection lose their value. 
!n 1931 the J~ited ~tates sat on the League Council and took the 
leaci 1n Qea~l~g ~lth the Manchurian Crisis. Yet, even with 
strong h~er:S2~ 1 ~2dership toe League failed. 8dditionally, the 
United Stat2~ O la co-operate WIth the League on many other 
activities, as~je iro@ the Manchurian Crisis. 
dor isor, ';:-,c.; otter navalists say that tne treaties , damaged 
h;lIerican na~Ja~ strength in World~var II. AgaIn, this view.! like 
~ne treaties provid~d the nations 
wit n the ~im2 ~o Jl an their future fleets. ~hus, the ships which 
tne Unite~ ~tat 2 s built for ~orld ~ar 11 were significantly 
oetter tna~ C~~3e built in the 1~20 s and early 1930s. If the 
Lnlted Std c 23 ~aa not Signed the treaties it was unlike l y that 
~onsr ess wo~l~ nave voted the large appropriatIons necessary to 
j 
~e~~ tne navy a thoroughly modern one. l.ns teae! I it is likely 
tnat Congress wou16 have let toe navy s lowly ag~. Congress did 
nut keep the navy up to treaty .levels; and without a clear danger 
It was unlikely tnat it would authorize a .large construction 
program. 'l'hu Sf the fleet of riorld War ~1 wou.ld have been 
sigrlificantly older and weaker than it actual.lY was during the 
'Nar. 'l'hat thIS breathing space helped the united ,states may oe 
douoted. But an examination of American technlcal achievements 
oetween tne wars shows that the rlmericans did galn an advanatge. 
00me of the tecn n ical changes: .Kadar, sonar , oil burning ships, 
snips capable of steaming with fast carriers , . . t . , S-De ter radlO, etc. 
~ final criticism against the tieaties comes from both the 
realists and navalists. 'i'his criticism is that the treaties 01 
not prevent WO[l.d War II. ·ttlat lS true. dut the treaties were 
never intendea to be perfect. They ref.lect~d the status-guo and 
national inter~~ts of the 1920s and early 1930s. After Manchuria 
the .) apanese:.'.a t.lona 1 interes ts cnaw~ed . Nothing the United 
S ta tes cou:!..d short of armed conflict, COU.Ld have prevented 
that change. bJt it wa s not until Germany had started World War 
11 that the Dn:'"':2c.; .:>tates government contempl.ated war with Japan, 
b 
and on.ly beca~s~ :~ ~as a German ally. 
Wor ld cc~al~l~ns changed in the 1~30s and the treaties 
oecame anaChronlS~S . ~ational i n terets changed, as they always 
O·'r' , v, al-.d the 
Considering 
~r2atles either had to change or be abandoned. 
t r>:: G2.:,ana s 'Nhicll at first the i"rench and then the 
JdpaneSe fina~Lj piaced upon the other nations, it was perhaps 
inevitable th~ t t~2 treaties would expire in the unstable 1~30s. 
4 
_,;)c:.j tne i.ess, t(iC:i tiad done the Ir ci u ty of prov iJ l.ns s ecur i ty . 
ln the encl the ~'ldsning ton treaty dnd its 3ucessors were a 
3UCC2SS . ~heJ succeeded in tne yoals s~t for them and they dId 
~0 t limit the abilitIes of the sIgnatorIes to defend themselves 
eVe/lTvJ/tj-
or~to prosecute Wor~d War II. ~hey helped to provide peace and 
restrict annallients expenditures. ~hey were born of converging 
na -clonal interests and it was \vben these same interests diverged 
t!1at they died . 
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